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Abstract
Writers have responded to new media technologies of writing and communicating 
by refashioning existing literate practices for computers and developing new computing 
practices.  Combining historical research on hypertextual, collaborative writing 
environments from the 1960s with situated studies of current writers adopting software to 
support memory and invention, my dissertation examines the reflexive processes through 
which material technologies, literate practices, and literate ideologies are shaped. 
Prompted by the rapid proliferation of computer technologies and their disruption of 
existing practices, many writing researchers have focused on the materiality of writing; 
however, a comprehensive framework that links materiality, ideologies, and practices has 
remained elusive.  In this dissertation, I argue that a combination of theories of mediated 
activity and actor-network theory offers a productive way to understand, and intervene in, 
emergent uses of writing technologies.
This dissertation begins with the early history of personal computers for writing. 
Although Douglas Engelbart’s NLS computer from the late 1960s has influenced modern 
hardware and software design in some ways, its writing software was less well received. 
Comparing Engelbart’s ideas about writing with composition research, especially early 
writing process theory, I argue that writing research has much to gain from engaging with 
complex models of digital writing that foreground embodied rhetorical work, such as the 
one developed alongside the NLS.
Later chapters present the results of several years’ worth of interviews with writers 
regarding their use of new writing software.  Like the users of Engelbart’s NLS,
iii
 they describe frustration with complex interfaces and disruptions to their writing practices. 
This dissertation uses moments of disruption to examine the processes through which new 
forms of writing emerge and technologies are altered or abandoned. A key goal of this 
dissertation is to provide thick descriptions of how writers’ goals are realized, frustrated, 
and reshaped through their engagement with technologies.  By creating a clearer picture of 
the history and modern deployment of the artifacts, practices, and ideologies available to 
writers, my dissertation proposes a more strategic, rhetorical view of computing that may 
aid writers, teachers, and designers as they navigate the interface between digital 
technologies and the demands of rhetorical situations.
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1Chapter 1
Reassembling Computer-Mediated Literate Activity
Confronted with lost data, inexplicable formatting issues, indecipherable icons, and 
mixed interface metaphors, writers using computers may look back nostalgically at the 
tools of earlier times, judging them to be easier or at least more straightforward in their 
function.  Troubles with technology, however, have faced writers throughout history. 
Keyboards, at least, keep fingers ink-free and require less maintenance than a quill pen, 
which needed much more delicate carving than a modern pencil and had to be sharpened 
up to sixty times a day (Tenner, 2003, p. 188).  Steel pens, although doing away with the 
need to sharpen a point, actually became corroded by the ink used in them (Tenner, 2003, 
p. 190).  Computer technologies may provide the most immediate frustration for writers, 
but they represent just the latest examples in a long history of exasperation. 
Seeking relief from problems with their tools, writers yearn for a medium that 
provides “a more immediate or authentic experience,” as Jay David Bolter and Richard 
Grusin (1999) argue, which ironically leads writers “to become aware of the new medium 
as a medium” (p. 19).  Bolter and Grusin identify this oscillation between immediacy and 
hypermediacy as a defining feature of the history of media.  With immediacy, the 
mediating aspects of the medium fade into invisibility—as in virtual reality, which does 
away with the graphical user interface and even the distance between the user and the 
monitor in an attempt at uber-realism.  With hypermediacy, the interfaces multiply in the 
foreground rather than recede out of view—as with cable news shows and their text tickers, 
picture-in-picture graphics, and studios containing several video screens. Word processors 
2allowed writers to bypass white-out and penciled-in arrows for more immediate editing on 
the screen (although countless handbooks and teachers, this one included, continue to 
advise writers to print their texts for editing and proofreading).  With the proliferation of 
hypertext in the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, word processors were criticized by 
some as too linear, too much like print, while hypertext software afforded more natural 
ways of representing thoughts—non-linear and associative (Landow, 1997; Nelson, 1983).1 
“Whenever one medium seems to have convinced viewers of its immediacy,” Bolter and 
Grusin point out, “other media try to appropriate that conviction” (p. 9).  Following this 
logic, some understood writing with hypertext as more immediate than word processors, 
with their unnatural interfaces and print-bound requirements.
Prompted by the rapid proliferation of new writing technologies, many writing 
researchers, like Bolter and Grusin, have focused on the materiality of writing and its 
relationship to a writer’s thoughts and the texts that are produced (e.g., Bolter, 2001; Bruce 
& Rubin, 1993; Bruce & Hogan, 1998; Haas, 1996; Hayles, 2002; Honeycutt, 2004; Kress 
& Van Leeuwen, 2001; Spinuzzi, 2003).  Bolter (2001) notes that “Writing, even writing 
on a computer screen, is a material practice, and it becomes difficult for a culture to decide 
where thinking ends and the materiality of writing begins, where the mind ends and the 
writing space begins” (p. 13).  Writing, in other words, is not simply the unaltered 
transcription of mental thoughts, but instead an activity shaped by numerous forces, 
including the affordances of writing technologies.  Tracking the influence of these 
technologies proves incredibly difficult, as Bolter suggested.  Writers cannot be expected 
1 Vannevar Bush (1945) is often credited with providing the inspiration for hypertext with his Memex 
machine, which implemented an analog method for writers to represent associative thoughts and 
connections between texts.  I discuss his work in greater detail in chapter 3.
3to, as Christina Haas (1996) explains, “constantly and consciously attend to their writing 
tools”; after all, “Writers value their technologies precisely because, through use, these 
technologies become transparent” (p. xi).  Learning to write well with a particular 
technology, in other words, makes a writer less able to articulate the ways the technology 
participated in shaping the text.  At the same time, literate activity (Prior, 1998) would not 
be possible without these technologies, and thus they clearly play a prominent role in 
writing of all kinds—alphabetic texts, multimodal electronic and print texts, sound texts, 
and image design.  As these scholars and others have argued, writing researchers must 
continue to investigate the role of material technologies on the production, distribution, and 
reception of texts.
In addition to attending to a tool’s particular materiality and functions, investigating 
the role of technology requires an understanding of writers’ practices with these tools, and 
their particular ideologies in relation to them.  In their study of the adoption of innovative 
writing software in Alaskan schools, Bertram C. Bruce and Andee Rubin (1993) found that 
teachers “recreated” the program as they adopted it, “viewing it as but one element in a 
complex social setting” (p. 6).  As researchers then, Bruce and Rubin could not simply 
study an instance of this program in their offices, interpreting its features and capabilities. 
By observing the many different ways the software was implemented by teachers and used 
by groups of students they arrived at a “situated evaluation, one that analyzes the varieties 
of use of the innovation across contexts,” “focused on the innovation-in-use” (p. 203). 
Under such an evaluation of a writing technology, the question shifts from asking about its 
effect on writing to “What practices emerge as the innovation is incorporated into different 
4settings?” (p. 203).  This more open-ended question accounts for the variability in use, and 
leads researchers to investigate why and how the innovative technology can be taken up so 
differently.
Bruce and Rubin’s study also suggests the value of studying disruptive moments in 
technology use.  Many of the teachers struggled to implement the writing software in their 
classroom, and these difficulties made the interplay between writers and technology less 
transparent.  Bruno Latour (2005) explicitly advises researchers to study innovations, users 
adopting new technologies, and technologies that have broken down in order to see objects 
that “tend to make themselves invisible” (p. 80) when they are working properly (see also 
Bruce & Hogan, 1998 for more on the invisibility of technology).  By accounting for the 
transparency of technologies through studying them when they are visible during disruptive 
moments, researchers can more clearly see how these technologies interact with 
individuals, social groups, other artifacts, and ideologies.  
Although usability researchers have studied disruptions to routine use of computer 
technologies for some time, their focus has typically been on “solving” the problem (e.g., 
Norman & Draper, 1986; Tognazzini, 1992).  These solutions most often center on 
redesigning interfaces to be more intuitive for users.  However, as interface researchers 
John Carroll and Mary Beth Rosson (1987) suggest, breakdowns in activity involving 
computers and people result from paradoxical motivational and cognitive conflicts inherent 
to any complex learning task.  Although the complexity may ultimately overwhelm some 
users when the software is poorly designed, in other cases new forms of writing and 
computing will emerge and technologies will be altered and appropriated for other 
5purposes.  Thick descriptions of these emergent practices and processes have much to tell 
us about the interplay between materiality, practices, and ideologies in writing with new 
media. 
Reassembling Writing Technologies: Historical and Situated Studies of Rhetorical  
Activity is an attempt to understand the many roles computer technologies play in literate 
activity.  By focusing on moments of breakdown and innovation, adoption and 
abandonment, I trace how these roles are produced and resisted over time by a myriad of 
other actors.  To create a comprehensive framework that links materiality, ideology, and 
practices, I combine theories of mediated activity (Vygotsky, 1978; Wertsch, 1991, 1998; 
Engeström, 1993; Kaptelinin & Nardi, 2006) and actor-network theory (ANT) (Latour, 
2005, 1999b, 1996a, 1987).  By directing attention toward the often unseen networks of 
artifacts, people, and institutions supporting standard practices, ANT helps to explain the 
kinds of resistance and acceptance new technologies meet.  I use theories of mediated 
activity to supplement ANT’s focus on artifacts and their rich histories within broader 
networks with closer attention to particular actions and people’s complex motivations. 
This combination of ANT and mediated activity counters the simplified representations of 
writing with computers commonly found in discourse surrounding computer literacy and 
embedded in popular word processing software.  Viewing writers and technologies as 
collaborating during the situated activity of composition opens a space to depict the use of 
technology not as a matter of straightforward control (either by a person or a machine), but 
instead as the tactical coordination of active, mediating components.  In this way, the 
coordination of mediating technologies constitutes important rhetorical work.  
6In this dissertation, I propose to open the black box of computer technology, to use 
a term of Bruno Latour’s (1999b, 1987).  This term may, at first, appear to be at odds with 
my earlier contention that writing technologies become transparent and invisible through 
use.  However, as repeated use makes tools transparently useful, the processes and other 
actors involved in making that artifact and use possible become more opaque, closed off in 
a black box.  Once technologies or facts become black boxes, Latour (1987) argues, “no 
matter how controversial their history, how complex their inner workings, how large the 
commercial or academic networks that hold them in place, only their input and output 
count” (pp. 2-3).  In other words, writers working with tools that have become black boxed 
are only concerned with what is necessary to make the thing write, not these objects’ dense 
histories, technological complexity, or collectives of supportive actors.  
To trace these hidden, black-boxed elements, my research explores two sites.  The 
first is historical (chapters 2 & 3), focusing on Douglas Engelbart and the early personal 
computer project he led in the 1960s and 1970s.  With its innovative hypertextual, 
networked writing environment and five-key chording keyset (the mouse’s original 
partner), the history of the NLS illuminates how alternative possibilities for composition 
were erased as more conventionally print-oriented concerns became standard in hardware 
and software.  The second site of my research is contemporary (chapters 4 & 5), tracing ten 
graduate student writers’ adoption of software new to them.  These writers demonstrate an 
ingenuity in working with and against the affordances of technologies as they allow their 
goals to be shaped by some technologies but reject or modify others that are too disruptive. 
Together, these two sites allow me to consider the many ways computer technology 
7functions as a full-fledged actor within the dense networks in which writing takes place.  In 
this way, I hope to show that the sometimes disruptive mediations of computer technology 
do not have to be figured solely as problems to be solved, but instead represent 
opportunities to reimagine the possible.  Drawing on the concept of techne from ancient 
rhetoric, I conclude by suggesting that knowledge about computer use cannot be contained 
by handbooks of hard-and-fast rules, and that writers are better served by seeing 
computing, like writing, as an activity defined by shifting conditions that requires ongoing 
learning and experimentation. 
Determining Actors and Agency
Attributing agency to objects like writing technologies, making them full-fledged 
actors in the writing process, represents something of a departure from existing research in 
composition and rhetoric.  Typically, questions of agency are reserved for writers 
themselves, and their relationship to the culture at large and discursive formations. 
Rebecca Moore Howard (1994) identifies two main strands of inquiry into agency: 
Can writers express their “selves,” or are the very concepts of “self” and 
“individuality” illusions that protect the power of the status quo? Can writers 
control their writing processes, or are their writing processes—and, indeed, the 
writers themselves—constructed by their cultural settings? (p. 349)
Such inquiry hinges on issues of freedom and ideology, and assumes a split between 
individuals and culture.  From this split, at least two positions are possible: writers’ actions 
emerge from their own free will, or writers’ actions are predetermined by larger forces to 
which they are subject.
8In her review article in College English, Kathryn T. Flannery (1991) imagines “a 
continuum from the familiar individualism of the Cartesian ‘I’ to the determinism of the 
Althusserian subject” and asserts that “the bulk of composition practice would no doubt 
cluster toward the individualism end” (p. 702).  Represented in her article by Donald 
Murray and Marilyn Sternglass, individualism in composition studies posited writing as “a 
matter of courage, of taking a stand, of rebelling” (p. 702) and an individual cognitive 
activity that can be kept pure, separated from cultural and social influences in studies and 
in the classroom.  Flannery presents Marilyn Cooper and Michael Holzman as providing an 
opposing perspective, one that “focuses on the multiple forces that interact to shape the 
‘scene of writing’” (p. 704).  Agency in their model is less an act of rebellion against social 
structures, and more a recognition of “structural capacities” (p. 704), or the ways these 
structures enable and constrain action.  Furthermore, the very desire to act, in this model, is 
a “manifestation of the dialectic between the individual and her social circumstances” (p. 
705) and not something we can attribute solely to an individual.  Flannery is clearly 
sympathetic with this more postmodern understanding of agency, although she admits it 
may take the field’s attention off student writers.  After all, the sheer number of forces 
involved in the social scene of writing presented by Cooper and Holzman would seem to 
lead teachers toward understanding these forces rather than individual writers.  
Donald Jones’ (1996) article on John Dewey and agency begins from this 
seemingly bleak position in which postmodern compositionists find themselves.  Quoting 
Lester Faigley (1992), Jones critiques the theoretical underpinnings of social 
constructionism that leave the question of agency at an “impasse.”  Because composition 
9theorists like Faigley and James Berlin see language and thought as separate, Jones argues, 
they are left with only two options: either thought exists prior to, and thus separate from, 
language; or language determines thought.  Jones admits that Faigley only “reluctantly” 
accepts the latter position because neither he nor Berlin believe the first to be true, since it 
implies that people function as “autonomous agents.”  Through his readings of Faigley’s 
Fragments of Rationality and Berlin’s “Postructuralism, Cultural Studies, and the 
Composition Classroom,” Jones argues that the postmodernism of Faigley and Berlin 
cannot account for the agency demonstrated by their students as they refuse to overturn 
their perhaps unexamined acceptance of dominant culture when the only other option is the 
“skeptical detachment” of poststructuralism.
Instead of an anti-foundationalism that still sees thought and language as separate, 
Jones introduces John Dewey’s pragmatism, a non-foundational theory that presents 
experience as “the starting point of philosophic thought” (Dewey qtd. in Jones, 1996, p. 
88).  For Dewey, language contains the beliefs and experiences of others—not universal 
knowledge or a direct representation of reality.  New experiences can always go against 
these existing beliefs, and change language.  As Jones writes, 
Dewey believes individuals can achieve agency by critically examining language’s 
influential ways of believing because he places individuals and language in a 
transactional relationship, meaning a mutually influential interaction. . . . By 
considering discourse as a social product and operation—meaning a product and a 
process—Dewey creates a non-foundational theory of agency. (p. 94)
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Rather than saying that individuals and language interact or that one is primary, Dewey 
used the term “transaction” to indicate that both elements affect each other.  David R. 
Russell (1993) similarly uses Dewey’s non-foundational ideas as a way out of the impasse 
of composition as the content-less course.  Writing from this perspective, Russell argues, is 
a matter of learning to participate in some historically-situated human activity that 
requires some kinds of writing, it cannot be learned apart from the problems, the 
habits, the activities—the subject matter—of some group that found the need to 
write in that way to solve a problem or carry on its activities. (p. 194)
Writing courses, then, should present students with opportunities for inquiry by posing 
problems, as well as teaching the ways a discipline has traditionally pursued such inquiry 
and addressed similar problems.  Agency involves the ways writers engage in transactions 
with their environment, language, and disciplines of knowing—in each case people are not 
solely shaped by these elements; they also exert a force of their own.
Such a model paves the way for beginning to think about the agency of objects, 
starting from the position that objects and people exist in a transactional relationship.  Early 
research into computer-mediated composition, however, often saw agency as an either-or 
proposition.  Either computer writing technologies gave people an agency they didn’t have 
with print technologies (e.g., readers determined their own paths in hypertext, and writers 
were now free to represent their thoughts associatively and in non-linear fashion), or word 
processors overpowered writers and exerted too much influence on their writing.  One early 
controversial article by Marcia Peoples Halio (1990) suggested that first-year composition 
students writing with Macintosh computers wrote essays on less serious topics and with 
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more errors than students writing with IBM computers (without graphical interfaces).  In a 
response article in Computers and Composition (Slatin et al., 1990), writing teachers from 
across the country indicated that deans and other university administrators were using 
Halio’s article as evidence that Macintosh computers had been proven inferior to IBM PCs, 
and that future purchasing decisions should reflect the results of Halio’s study.  Some 
researchers within the new field of computers and composition resisted drawing such stark 
conclusions from limited data sets.  Gail Hawisher (1986), for example, reviewed existing 
research on word processors and argued that the sheer number of variables (in research 
methods, students, writing tasks, and software) should caution researchers from making 
general conclusions about the effects of word processors on writing.  
More recent work in computers and composition has moved away from examining 
whether word processors produce discrete effects on a writer’s style, syntax, or revision 
strategies.  The work of Hawisher and Cynthia Selfe, in particular, follows this trend and 
resonates with the perspective on agency that Jones and Russell attribute to Dewey. 
Inspired by Deborah Brandt’s (2001) research collecting literacy narratives, Hawisher and 
Selfe (2006; Selfe, Cynthia L. & Hawisher, 2004) trace the cultural ecologies within which 
digital technologies and writers exist.  As they explain,
In both global and local contexts the relationships among digital technologies, 
language, literacy, and an array of opportunities are complexly structured and 
articulated within a constellation of existing social, cultural, economic, historical, 
and ideological factors that constitute a cultural ecology of literacy. These 
ecological systems continually shape, and are shaped by, people (Giddens)—at a 
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variety of levels and in a range of ways—as they live out their daily lives in 
technological and cultural settings (Selfe and Hawisher). (Hawisher & Selfe, 2006, 
p. 619)
Unlike earlier studies that examined a particular software program and a writer’s text and 
experiences with the software (such as those surveyed in Hawisher, 1988, 1986), Hawisher 
and Selfe turn their attention to individuals and their experiences within these cultural 
ecologies.  Their focus is on literacy, and the ways that people learn and develop 
technological literacy, but the narratives they elicit from their researcher co-authors explore 
more than just scenes of writing or computer use.  
In using the term “ecology,” their work aligns with Dewey’s understanding of 
human activity as a transaction between people and the environment.  Bertram Bruce (in 
press) claims that “if he were writing today, [Dewey] might choose a term such as 
‘ecology,’  . . . That would foreground his view of society as an organic union (cf. Latour’s 
assembly), not simply a system of interacting parts.”  This latter perspective of social 
action implies that one participant (say, the person) acts and remains unaffected, while the 
other participant (say, the object) reacts and is changed.  These actions and reactions may 
bounce back and forth (first the person acts on the object, then the object acts on the 
person), but action typically moves in one direction.  Describing social actions in terms of 
“transactions,” however, involves a different view of the relationship between elements in 
an ecology.  The sociobiologist Richard Charles Lewontin explains this relationship by 
saying, “The relation between organism and environment is not simply one of interaction 
of internal and external factors, but of a dialectical development of organism and milieu in 
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response to each other” (qtd. in Cooper, 1986, p. 368).  Hawisher and Selfe (2006) 
illustrate this dialectical movement with the literacy narratives of two women from China 
and Taiwan respectively.  Both women do more than interact with teachers, family, cultural 
forms, and literacy practices—they are formed by these ecological elements and also shape 
their own development through their particular choices.  As Hawisher and Selfe note about 
one of the women, “given the overdetermined—and often invisible—force of cultural 
tendencies, Yi-Huey’s tenacity, her motivation to acquire and develop digital literacy, 
attests to the power of her personal agency within the cultural ecology she inhabits” (p. 
633).  In other words, Yi-Huey is no cultural dupe, blindly acting out the role 
predetermined for her by larger forces, but neither is she an autonomous agent, able to 
actualize her pure, individual, and unique intentions.
Deborah Brandt and Katie Clinton (2002) turn to the work of Bruno Latour to 
challenge these kinds of separations between “the local and the global, agency and 
structure, and literacy and its technology” (p. 338).  Although they have found great value 
in the social practice perspective of literacy, that situates reading and writing practices as 
made and re-made in local contexts by active agents, Brandt and Clinton argue that this 
work has swung too far in the direction of the individual, assigning people too much power 
in their relations with literacy and social structures.  While acknowledging that social 
practice theorists (Gee, 1990; Heath, 1983; Street, 1984) were right to challenge the “Great 
Divide” literacy theorists’ contention (Goody, 1986; Goody & Watt, 1968; Olson, 1977; 
Ong, 1982) that literacy functioned autonomously to change people’s cognitive abilities, 
Brandt and Clinton propose Latour’s theory of actants as a more productive middle ground. 
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The impasse that arises when viewing literacy as either a local or global phenomenon can 
be avoided, they argue, 
by treating literacy not as an outcome or accomplishment of local practices but as a 
participant in them, as an actor or what Latour coins an “actant” in its own right. 
Literacy is neither a deterministic force nor a creation of local agents. Rather it 
participates in social practices in the form of objects and technologies, whose 
meanings are not usually created nor exhausted by the locales in which they are 
taken up. (p. 338)
By conceptualizing literacy as an actor, researchers can continue to study the situated 
practices of people and still recognize the globalizing effects of local practices and literacy 
technologies.  
Under this model of agency, actors (whether humans or objects) are mediators 
“imbuing, resisting, and recrafting” (p. 346) the actions and materials of others.  Most 
importantly, objects, in this model, do not take away the agency of people.  As Brandt and 
Clinton note, Latour would likely agree with social practice theorists that people 
“individually and collectively, mediate literacy practices whenever they take them up” but 
at the same time insist “that objects are doing the same or possibly other things. They also 
are active mediators” (p. 346).  Returning to the PC vs. Macintosh debate started by Halio’s 
(1990) article, assigning objects the role of actor does not lead to the technological control 
of humans to the extent that certain kinds of computer operating systems determine the 
subject choice and error rate of a writer’s texts.  These operating systems certainly mediate 
a writer’s literate activity, but writers too mediate the functions of computer systems—as 
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Dewey says, they exist in a transactional relationship.  In other words, the agency of 
objects in situations like these is distributed, it derives partly from what people have done 
at other times and places to fashion the object in particular contexts.         
Taking the active, mediating role of objects as a starting point, education scholars 
David Williamson Shaffer and Katherine A. Clinton (2006) propose a new analytical 
category, toolforthoughts, in order to highlight the “cognitive agency” (p. 283) of computer 
tools.  Following the recognition that “A procedure that can be described to a computer can 
be carried out independent of any person” (p. 287), Shaffer and Clinton argue that a virtual 
culture constituted by the symbolic processing power of computers offers “a more 
embodied, and more epistemologically inclusive” “range of powerful representational tools 
[to] support multiple pathways to understanding”  (p. 288).  Computer games and other 
virtual simulations, they argue, resist the accounts of agency and tool use as currently 
described in theories of distributed cognition and mediated action.  Under these theories, 
tools do shape the actions of people and the activity in general, but cannot be said to “act.” 
Acting, under these theories, is the province of humans alone.  But virtual worlds challenge 
these theories, Shaffer and Clinton argue, because they do seem to act on their own:
new forms of reading and writing such as we find in videogames and other 
simulations require a degree of projection (or inhabitance) that makes it 
increasingly difficult to analytically separate person from tool. Indeed, what is the 
ubiquitous avatar if not a representation of the tight coupling between 
computationally literate person and computational literacy object? (p. 295)
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In other words, virtual worlds do more than “shape” a person’s actions—they participate 
with people in the mutual mediation of activity and environments.
To account for the kinds of agency they attribute to computer technologies, Shaffer 
and Clinton develop a theory of “distributed mind” that centers on the concept of 
toolforthoughts.  In theories of distributed cognition and mediated activity, they argue, 
tools and thoughts are represented as separate, one orienting externally and the other 
internally.  They challenge this representation, arguing that tools and thoughts are 
inextricably connected—that “just as tools are externalizations of human designs, thoughts 
are internalizations of our actions with tools” (p. 290).  They claim to be following “Dewey 
and posit[ing] explicitly that tools and thoughts are fundamentally the same kind of thing 
(Hickman, 1991)” (p. 290).  Therefore, as noted, they coin the term “toolforthought” to 
indicate the lack of distinction between tools and thoughts.  More than the sum of their 
parts, toolforthoughts “neither act nor are acted upon; rather, they interact to produce a 
model of thinking in which biological cognition has the same ontological status as that of 
other elements in the system” (p. 292).  With computational toolforthoughts that create 
virtual worlds, it becomes more difficult to assign primacy to humans within systems of 
distributed cognition.  They argue against continuing to center analyses of such systems on 
what the people do, their motives, and the results of their actions.  They cite as 
foundational to their argument Latour’s (1996b) claim that neither people nor objects “act,” 
both tools and humans are mediators of others, and action is the result of mutual mediation. 
The toolforthought concept reflects this model of mutual mediation by erasing a priori 
distinctions between the properties and affordances of thoughts and tools.
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Shaffer and Clinton (2006) illustrate their model by responding to a typical critique 
to the inclusion of thinking tools into a curriculum.  In this critique, students do not learn 
algebra when using advanced spreadsheets and computer applications, and at a more basic 
level, do not learn adding when using calculators.  Their ability to learn a mental process, 
in other words, is sacrificed by the inclusion of the tool.  Shaffer and Clinton instead claim 
that
Using a calculator to add 2 + 2 does not sacrifice the ability to add. That capacity is 
still present in the person–calculator system. What is sacrificed is the understanding 
that would come from working with the calculator to do something we cannot do 
with pencil and paper alone. (p. 294)
They point to the curricula as the problem in examples such as these, not the tools.  All 
learning, they argue, involves the “collaboration of toolforthoughts” (p. 294) because 
thoughts and tools cannot be distinguished.  Limiting a curriculum to certain kinds of 
modeling systems (like algebra) restricts what students can do with other systems and 
combinations of toolforthoughts.  
It is only a small step from calculators to grammar and spelling checkers, and the 
arguments of traditional composition instructors that such tools deprive students of 
fundamental and valuable knowledge.  However, some within computers and composition 
(e.g., McGee & Ericsson, 2002) have already begun to move in the direction indicated by 
Shaffer and Clinton, advocating for changes in curricula rather than solely banning these 
tools.  While McGee and Ericsson ultimately seem inclined to encourage students to avoid 
Microsoft Word’s grammar checker while drafting an essay (its green underlining 
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unnecessarily directs writers’ focus to sentence-level issues during composing, not just 
during revision and proofreading), they still believe that teachers can use the checker to 
initiate critical engagement with issues of style.  In this way, they align with Shaffer and 
Clinton, who assert that “the reason for introducing new technologies into the classroom is 
not to recreate existing activities, but rather to allow more compelling possibilities that new 
toolforthoughts provide” (p. 294).  Rather than replacing students’ proofreading skills with 
mechanical grammar checkers, such software can be used to refashion both writers’ and 
teachers’ understanding of the role of style and correctness and their place in writing 
activity.
Proponents of activity theory have resisted models of agency and activity, like 
Shaffer and Clinton’s toolforthought, that grant equivalence to humans and artifacts.  In 
their recent overview of activity theory and its application to interface design, Victor 
Kaptelinin and Bonnie Nardi (2006) explicitly refute any symmetry between people and 
objects.  Although they acknowledge that objects can act, in the sense that they can 
produce effects, “the agency manifested by the subject of activity is of a special character. 
It can be defined as the ability and the need to act” (p. 33).  In other words, people act from 
their intentions, while objects have none.  Contrasting this perspective with actor-network 
theory, Kaptelinin and Nardi argue that the material agency depicted in ANT mistakenly 
attributes human capabilities to artifacts.  Artifacts do not “resist” people of their own 
accord, they only appear that way when they “fail to behave as some human desires” (p. 
240).  Under their model, activity is always “oriented by a human-defined object” (p. 240), 
and the effects of an artifact’s actions are to be understood in relation to a human’s 
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objective.  ANT’s model of mutual mediation depicts intention somewhat differently, 
tracing how a person’s intent is translated through many different mediators (human and 
nonhuman) to produce effects.  These translations make it impossible to ever locate a 
primary intention that circumscribes a particular activity.  
As Stephen Witte (2005) has argued, one of the limits of activity theory concerns 
the boundaries of a study—how to determine the origin of an intention and which actions 
to count as part of the activity.  Kaptelinin and Nardi have described needs and intentions 
as culturally mediated, but stop short of detailing the ways that these intentions circulate 
and how they can be attributed to individuals.  Their primary reason for placing such 
emphasis on intent, they acknowledge, arises from their fear that some may use ANT as an 
opportunity to dismiss their responsibility for their actions, and instead attribute it to 
objects—something like the way executives in a major corporation may deny individual 
responsibility for the actions of the corporation.  Shaffer and Clinton (2006) address this 
fear by distinguishing responsibility from accountability—objects may be responsible for 
certain actions, but we need not hold them accountable in the same ways we hold people. 
“Human beings,” they argue, “bear the moral weight of freedom to choose that even a 
theory of distributed mind does not ascribe to tools” (p. 292).  For my project, the limits of 
continuing to place human activity at the center of analysis, as Kaptelinin and Nardi 
propose, present too great an obstacle to creating a more detailed picture of the roles 
computer technologies play in literate activity.  In chapter 4 I address their concerns at 
greater length, and provide a more detailed comparison of ANT and their model of activity 
theory.    
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The theories of activity surveyed here, while differing somewhat in their 
assignment of agency to the various actors involved, all provide valuable tools for 
investigating literate practices and the technologies that support them.  They turn 
researchers’ attention toward close analysis of the historical development of people and 
their tools (cultural, mental, physical), showing how contemporary practice and cognition 
has been structured over time and the factors that tend to disrupt existing patterns.  In this 
dissertation, I attempt to construct a framework that includes elements of cultural-historical 
activity theory (CHAT), actor-network theory, and distributed cognition in order to trace 
the close interactions and entwined development of people, writing technologies, and 
literate activities.  From ANT, I pay close attention to the historical development of 
technologies, and the social processes that shape their creation and distribution.  Adding to 
ANT certain elements from CHAT concerning human motivations and paying attention to 
specific, local, and situated manipulations of tools affords a perspective that takes into 
account the complexity of both human and nonhuman actors, without privileging any 
actors because of pre-existing categories.  Theories of distributed cognition similarly lend a 
more expanded perspective on the process of cognition, seeing them as systemic rather than 
the properties of individuals, and connecting these theories to ANT allows me to leave 
behind questions of context that distributed cognition has trouble answering.  Through 
analyses of the historical NLS computer project and contemporary writers’ recent adoption 
of bibliographic and note-taking software, I draw these theories together over the course of 
the next four chapters.
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One of the primary benefits of this framework, I argue, lies in its ability to counter 
existing explanations regarding the diffusion of technologies and the reasons people accept 
or reject them.  Such explanations, as I’ll explore throughout the chapters, typically rely on 
the simplistic binary of difficult/easy or superstitious claims about whether a device is 
ahead of its time.  Certain factors, such as interface complexity, transfer of skills from 
analog to digital environments, and the good timing of matching goals and the affordances 
of tools do play a role in technology adoption, but they alone cannot account for the 
complex social interactions involved in technology development, adoption, and prolonged 
use.  In the next section, I take up the case of alternative keyboard layouts (Dvorak vs. 
QWERTY) to provide an initial illustration of the limits of existing analyses.
The Continued Dominance of QWERTY Keyboards
In her critique of existing research in Technology Studies, Christina Haas (1996) 
argues that “studies of technology tend to focus either on the fine-detailed, real-time 
processes of technology development, learning, or use; or they examine the broad sweep of 
change at the cultural and historical level” (p. 37).  How can we understand both the role of 
technology in individual writing processes and the ways technology also forms and reacts 
to larger cultural trends?  Haas turns to research on “embodied practice,” citing the work of 
Jean Lave (1988), Mark Johnson (1987), and Paul Connerton (1989) as a way to bridge this 
gap between “writing as cognitive process and writing as cultural practice” (p. 37). 
Through a focus on situated, embodied activity, these scholars all provide a perspective on 
human activity that allows us to recognize, as Brandt and Clinton (2002) explain: “local 
events can have globalizing tendencies and globalizing effects, accomplished often through 
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the mediation of globalizing technologies” (p. 347).  In other words, no autonomous global 
forces exist apart from local, situated activities that are more or less connected with other 
actors.  These connections, as actor-network theory proposes, allow for shaping influences 
to travel outside of local events, translated through media, technologies, and people.  To 
illustrate the value of combining actor-network theory with theories of mediated activity, I 
turn now to the embodied activity of typing and the keyboard itself.  
Studies of the QWERTY keyboard and its proliferation in the face of alternate key 
arrangements tend to reflect the division Haas identified.  QWERTY’s dominance is 
typically explained through economic theories of markets (global forces) or detailed 
examinations of artifacts (local use), looking at the distance between keys and the 
frequency of alternating between left and right hands.  Without integrating these analyses, 
however, it can be difficult to fully evaluate QWERTY and alternate layouts.  Such 
evaluations have become more crucial in recent decades as the proliferation of computers 
has turned typing into a crucial skill for literate people.  
Many folk theories seeking to explain the arrangement of keys in the QWERTY 
layout argue that it was designed to prevent typewriters from jamming up by people typing 
too quickly (figure 1).  This theory contains some truth—QWERTY’s designer, 
Christopher Sholes, was the inventor of the first commercially successful typewriter and he 
arrived at the layout in order to prevent jamming.  However, the jamming was caused by 
pressing two adjacent keys in succession.  The QWERTY layout spreads letters commonly 
used together in English to different sides (e.g., “t” and “h,” “e” and “n,” “i” and “e,” etc.), 
which actually ends up affording faster typing than a strictly alphabetical layout (Sholes’ 
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first design) since typists can alternate between right and left hands for these common pairs 
of letters (and alternating hands is faster than typing sequences of letters with one hand 
alone).
Even though the QWERTY layout improves alternation of hands over an alphabetic 
layout, typists and speed coaches from the 19th century reported that they felt the design 
was inefficient; as Tenner (2003) recounts, one “speed coach went on to note that most of 
the writing was done on the left hand and that too many words were typed by that hand 
only” (p. 203).2  Recognizing the same patterns of inefficiency with the QWERTY layout 
in his own studies, August Dvorak (1936) developed an alternative layout designed to 
create more alternation between hands, and to allow users to type 
2 Several applications available on the Web can calculate the number of consecutive letters done with one 
hand, e.g., < http://www.acm.vt.edu/%7Ejmaxwell/dvorak/keyboard.html>.  For instance, the first 
paragraph of this chapter consists of 740 characters (136 words), and with a QWERTY keyboard, 39% 
would be typed with the same hand, and only 29% would be on the “home row,” with fingers moving a 
total distance of 23 meters.  The alternative Dvorak layout results in quite different figures: 22% on the 
same hand, 65% on the home row, with a distance of 14 meters.  
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Figure 1.  Folk explanation of QWERTY design
(Longstreth, Cardiff, & Carleton-Barnes, 2005, p. 3)
more English words on the “home row,” thereby reducing finger-travel distance (figure 2). 
Dvorak claimed that his design helped users type more rapidly and with greater comfort. 
However, by 1936, when Dvorak patented his layout, the QWERTY layout had been 
standard for almost sixty years and typing schools started by typewriter manufacturers had 
been teaching touch typing for QWERTY nearly as long.  Thus, even if some typists had 
complained about the QWERTY design to their speed coaches, few wanted to purchase a 
Dvorak machine and learn its layout.  They had acquired “hard-won motor reflex skills [on 
the QWERTY]; they were reluctant, in the business world, to trade certain proficiency for 
uncertain gains, no matter how critical of QWERTY they could be in laboratory 
settings” (Tenner, 2003, p. 205).  New typists were equally reluctant to 
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Figure 2.  Dvorak keyboard layout (for computer).
Image source: Wikimedia Commons: 
<http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:KB_United_States_Dvorak.svg>
learn QWERTY—after all, it was unlikely that their future employer would have purchased 
Dvorak typewriters instead of the standard, QWERTY versions.
The economist Paul A. David (1985) argues that QWERTY is a perfect example of 
“path-dependence,” where historical events continue to exert an influence on economic 
outcomes in the present, such that certain standards can become “locked-in” and prevent 
challenges from alternative methods.  Citing a 1940s comparative study conducted by the 
Navy and Apple computer advertising copy as proving the superiority of Dvorak, David 
concludes that the typewriter industry was driven to standardize “the wrong system” (p. 
336).  David provides three reasons for QWERTY’s initial standardization:  1) the 
development of touch-typing systems created typists proficient with only one layout; 2) 
economies of scale led to more QWERTY typewriters and more QWERTY touch-typists; 
and 3) even as hardware innovations in the 1880s allowed users to convert keyboards to 
any layout, re-training typists had much greater costs.  In this model, even if individual 
users might prefer to accept the costs of learning Dvorak (for the first time, or through re-
training) they are unlikely to do so because these conditions lead them to believe few 
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manufacturers will continue to produce Dvorak keyboards and few employers will provide 
them.
David’s thesis has been challenged within the field of economics, most prominently 
by Stan Liebowitz and Stephen Margolis (1999).  They summarize the argument for path-
dependence by referencing the failed Betamax video recorder:
An established standard can persist over a challenger, even where all users prefer a 
world dominated by the challenger, if users are unable to coordinate their choices. 
For example, each of us might prefer to have Beta-format videocassette recorders 
as long as pre-recorded Beta tapes continue to be produced, but individually we do 
not buy Beta machines because we don’t think enough others will buy Beta 
machines to sustain the prerecorded tape supply. I don’t buy a Beta format machine 
because I think that you won’t; you don’t buy one because you think that I won’t. 
In the end, we both turn out to be correct, but we are both worse off than we might 
have been.  (p. 19)
Liebowitz and Margolis see such a case as an example of market failure, which they wish 
to challenge because proof of market failures could lead to more government regulation of 
markets.  Their primary strategy in challenging David’s model lies in disproving the claims 
that standard technologies are inferior to later alternatives.  They examine three such cases
—Betamax vs. VHS, Macintosh vs. DOS, and Dvorak vs. QWERTY.  In their critique of 
David’s article, they refute the findings of the Navy study he cited, noting that it was 
conducted by Dvorak himself and can hardly be considered unbiased.  Furthermore, if the 
Navy study did conclude that Dvorak was better, as David claimed, no reasons were 
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provided to account for the military’s decision to continue training typists in QWERTY.  If 
the Dvorak layout truly led to the increased typing rates Dr. Dvorak claimed in the Navy 
study, then all corporations would be happy to switch, Liebowitz and Margolis argue, 
because their investment would be paid back many times over.  They cite later studies 
comparing the two layouts that found no great advantage to Dvorak in speed or ease of 
learning.  Additionally, they claim, its ergonomic benefits have yet to be proven.  In this, 
and their other cases, they claim that the markets have not failed, and an inferior product 
has not been locked-in simply because it was first.  
These economists provide different explanations for the persistence of QWERTY 
keyboards over more than a hundred years—David points to a mixture of historical factors 
(at individual and collective levels) while Liebowitz and Margolis focus squarely on 
evaluations of the artifact itself.  Certainly Liebowitz and Margolis are correct to critique 
the evidence on which David rests his case for the superiority of Dvorak in typewriters—
few studies have been done comparing the two keyboards and their results do not seem to 
point to a clear advantage for either layout.  But at the same time, as reviewer Richard J. 
Sullivan (2003) notes, they do not fully refute David’s arguments for the inclusion of 
historical analyses in economic models.  Sullivan claims that “underlying their analysis is a 
model with a single, global ‘best’ outcome.  The issue then becomes whether we have 
attained the best outcome, and if not, how can we get there.”  With their overwhelming 
focus on individual typists and their speed in using QWERTY or Dvorak keyboards, 
Liebowitz and Margolis seem to ignore the ways people’s choices and uses of artifacts are 
historically shaped.  It seems somewhat naïve to call a new typist’s use of a QWERTY 
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keyboard in the late 20th century a “choice.”  Nonetheless, alternatives are available and 
used by some typists—QWERTY is not so dominant that other options are unavailable or 
unusable.  How, then, should we interpret the history of this writing instrument and 
evaluate its influence and role in present literate activity?
Although David’s evaluation of Dvorak as a superior technology may be based on 
faulty evidence, his analysis of QWERTY persuasively explains how it was standardized 
early in the history of typewriter technology, and the conditions that continue to strengthen 
that standard.  After QWERTY had achieved transparency as a technology and existed 
synonymously with keyboard technology, evaluating Dvorak keyboards proved difficult 
because, as Tenner (2003) notes, even speed typists who critiqued QWERTY were 
reluctant to give it up for the risk of an unproven layout.  Furthermore, evaluations of both 
keyboard technologies have been shaped by a variety of actors (e.g., corporations 
employing typing pools, speed-typing competitions, typing schools, etc.) with specific 
interests in examining the criteria of speed and accuracy (in learning and in use). 
Ergonomic factors only count in such evaluations if they are linked concretely to increases 
in either speed or accuracy.  Dvorak himself made these links through his concern 
with every detail of skill regardless of keyboard design, especially developing a 
rapid, light touch (“ballistic motion”) and reducing tension.  He was a connoisseur 
of techniques, showing aspiring typists and typing teachers how they could benefit 
from the “looseness and lightness” of top performers in fields as different as 
tournament golf and window washing. (Tenner, 2003, p. 202)
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However, while these techniques (coupled with Dvorak’s ergonomic keyboard design) 
were aimed at more rapid typing with typewriters, they may be used today to reduce the 
chances of injury.  In their survey of medical literature on carpal tunnel syndrome, Mircea 
Fagarasanu and  Shrawan Kumar (2003) found studies suggesting that the QWERTY 
design encourages more awkward and damaging hand and arm movements than Dvorak, 
and that different typing techniques, regardless of keyboard, had been shown to reduce risk 
of carpal tunnel syndrome.  These more recent studies (most published after both David’s 
and Liebowitz and Margolis’s work) suggest that Dvorak keyboards are ergonomically 
better than QWERTY versions, even if they do not lead users to type faster or more 
accurately.  
The same affordances that make typing with computers faster and more accurate 
than typewriters (no need to move the carriage return, no adding new sheets of paper, 
easily edit text on the screen) also afford greater levels of repetitive stress injuries as typists 
subject their limbs to uninterrupted movements, a high risk factor for such injuries (Tenner, 
1997).  With these contrasts between the qualities of speed and ergonomics, there can never 
be, as Liebowitz and Margolis imply, a superior choice that takes all possible benefits into 
account for every condition, writer, and task.  Even with the mechanical ease of switching 
between QWERTY and Dvorak on a computer keyboard, many computer users remain 
with QWERTY, out of ignorance of alternatives, or a desire to stick with the standard, or a 
reluctance to re-learn touch-typing.  Other writers may find Dvorak the best after injuring 
themselves on QWERTY and wishing to prevent further injury.  Through a framework 
combining ANT with theories of mediated action, an analysis of keyboard design and use 
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would examine the artifacts themselves, situated uses of those artifacts, collective and 
individual actors connected to those uses, recent and historical motives of these actors, and 
the histories of their uses.  Attributing agency to inanimate objects like keyboards can seem 
to violate common sense, although as I argued earlier, in a refigured model of agency in 
which all actions are instances of mutual mediation, keyboards play a large role in writing 
processes.    
Conclusion
Throughout the next four chapters in this dissertation, I continue to refine this 
theoretical framework by examining the historical and contemporary development of 
computer technologies and practices.  The QWERTY example illustrated the necessity of 
understanding artifacts, networks of associations between actors, and the situated motives 
and actions of these actors in order to develop a detailed picture of the role of writing 
technologies in writing processes.  This kind of analysis differs from asking questions 
about the influence of writing tools on writing, which presupposes that “writing” exists 
prior to its inscription with a tool and is then altered by that tool.  Under a framework 
examining the mutual mediation of human and nonhuman actors, “writing” requires two 
active agents—people and tools.  Latour (1999b) depicts the historical circulation of 
translating mediations between people and tools as a process that “swaps” properties back 
and forth.  People use their knowledge of human organizations to “endow [nonhumans] 
with more and more organizational properties” (p. 207).  Conversely, “what has been 
learned from nonhumans,” he argues, “is reimported so as to reconfigure people” (p. 208). 
While typewriters may appear to shape writing to only include alphabetic text in linear 
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structures, these devices were assembled by people eager to write linear alphabetic text 
more rapidly and accurately.  Assigning an origin point to these mediations, while 
analytically useful and expedient, can only result in an artificial bounding of the process 
Latour identifies. 
Because of the almost inextricable weaving together of people and their tools over 
time, searching for definitive answers to questions about the roles of technologies in 
writing processes will not lead to satisfactory results.  Instead, I argue for an approach that 
asks writers to attend more reflectively to the mediational possibilities offered by writing 
technologies.  Instead of viewing the agency of writing tools as a threat to an imagined 
pure, unmediated writing process, I would ask writers to consider the active mediations, 
and even disruptions, of these tools as opportunities for rhetorical innovation and growth. 
The next chapter addresses this issue historically, examining the response users had to the 
disruptions introduced by a new computer system for writing.
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Chapter 2
Augmenting Literacy: Introducing Writing To Computers
Although computers seem to placidly await whatever work writers may require of 
them, in fact, their stable form masks a boisterous and contentious array of competing 
software, hardware, and computing practices.  Routine use of successful technologies 
makes them fade from conscious view and leads to the erasure of earlier and irregular 
forms.  Various sponsors contribute to this process of standardization, forming a dense 
network of practices, people, and artifacts held together through everyday activities easily 
taken for granted.  As mentioned in the first chapter, the sheer complexity of these 
networks becomes represented as a mundane singular entity—a black box, to use a term of 
Bruno Latour’s (1987). “The computer” now consists of a monitor, keyboard, and mouse, 
where before computer technology was represented by defense department contracts, 
corporate competition, user trials, fried circuits, and workaround fixes.  As scholars such as 
Bertram Bruce and Andee Rubin (1993) and Christina Haas (1996) have noted, there is no 
singular “computer,” only situated instantiations of various hardware and software put to 
different ends by a variety of people.  In tracing the networks of supporters and successful 
practices that allow computers to be taken for granted for writing, these researchers reveal 
the important ways tools always contribute to the shape of literate activity.  To extend their 
work, I propose turning to the early history of personal computer technology and the first 
uses of computers for writing that have now been forgotten.  Rather than tracing the 
historical paths of the artifacts that make up today’s successful computer, I start with the 
history of the unsuccessful NLS (On-Line System) project led by Douglas Engelbart. 
33
Breaking open the black box of the computer by re-animating non-standard and failed 
writing technologies illuminates the processes through which successful and transparent 
writing technologies and practices make new and innovative forms of literate activity 
appear inferior as opposed to simply alternative.
My project extends the efforts of several composition scholars who have called for 
more than critical reflection of the ideological underpinnings of computer writing 
technology.  Paul LeBlanc (1993) wrote nearly 15 years ago about the need for 
composition scholars to participate in the design of writing technologies, noting that with 
software, “the field can actively shape the tools it uses, and thus shape the conception of 
writing implicit in those tools” (p. 7).  In writing software, composition researchers come 
to a closer understanding of the ways computer technology shapes writing, and help guide 
that process as well.  More recently, Stuart Selber (2004) has argued that, in addition to the 
valuable critique of interfaces and other software elements (such as that by Selfe & Selfe, 
1994), “the profession also has an obligation to formulate better alternatives, to offer 
approaches and practices that are more responsible, broad-based, and productive” (p. 26). 
In his re-examination of functional computer literacy, Selber insists that compositionists 
hold a more reflexive view of computers as tools.  Certainly, uncritical acceptance of 
computers can lead to ignorance of the ways that tools mediate and structure our lives.  On 
the other hand though, “The computer, as a tool, depends upon a user, who if skilled 
enough can use and manipulate its (non-neutral) affordances to help reshape the world in 
potentially positive ways” (p. 40).  In addition, then, to the informed design of writing 
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software and interfaces, Selber points to skilled computer use as a valuable object of 
research and teaching.  
In this chapter, I use the case of the NLS, built during the later 1960s, to link the 
calls within composition for attention to computer design and practice with efforts in 
computer engineering to build technologies for writing.  Although he led the NLS project, 
Douglas Engelbart remains more often associated with the creation of hypertext and the 
invention of the mouse (Joyce, 2000; Landow, 1997; Rice, 2007).  More than just the first 
implementation of hypertext (van Dam, 1988), the NLS computer ran one of the first direct 
ancestors to word processors.  Engelbart, too, carefully considered the skilled use of 
computers, and the complexity of the NLS required a great deal of functional training. 
Engelbart saw computing as a means to address complex societal problems—even malaria 
eradication (Lowood & Adams, 1997, interview 1)—and believed that providing 
opportunities for writing through computers could be a first step.  Interestingly, Engelbart’s 
understanding of writing processes had much in common with early writing process theory, 
and I use the history of the NLS to show how these affinities might benefit composition 
and its research into the intersections between technology and literacy.
Computer History in Composition
Computers and composition research, while historicizing the connections between 
computers and writing instruction, has less often included the development of technologies 
in its historical work.  As Hawisher, Selfe, Moran, and LeBlanc (1996) note, humanities 
departments were late to gain access to technology, many nearly fifteen years after 
computers were first used for writing.  However, it is exactly because writing researchers 
35
and teachers were for the most part absent from the networks out of which computers were 
developed and distributed that histories of early computer technology are crucial. 
Beginning with Hugh Burns’ 1979 dissertation on computer-assisted invention techniques, 
the field of computers and writing has productively examined many facets of computer 
writing instruction.  There are numerous accounts of the effects of word processing on 
student writing (many listed in Hawisher, 1987, 1988), accounts of networked, 
synchronous computer discussion during class time (Faigley, 1992; Romano, 1993), and 
accounts of hypertext and writing (DeWitt, 1996; Joyce, 1995).  Histories of computers and 
writing that don’t involve composition instructors or students, though, are harder to find. 
The field needs a history of computers and computing as detailed and complex as histories 
of writers and writing prior to computers (e.g., Eldred & Mortensen, 2002; Royster, 2000; 
Schultz, 1999).  Such a history will enable a more critical perspective of writing tools, but 
more than that, it will facilitate the field’s intervention and participation in hardware and 
software creation, alongside the design of innovative uses for these tools.
One prominent example of a history of computers outside of composition 
classrooms is Christina Haas’ (1996) Writing Technology, which uses L.S. Vygotsky’s 
historical-genetic method to trace the creation of a graphical interface for Carnegie 
Mellon’s computer system.  She describes this method as “looking at technology in 
process, both in process of use and process of development, and in transition” (p. 18).  The 
value of the historical-genetic method comes in revealing the complex array of actors, 
artifacts, institutions, practices, and communities that contribute to the evolving 
development and use of a technology over time.  As Haas proposes, 
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Taking such a complex historical view of current technologies relieves us of the 
bind of technological determinism: When the history of a given technology—
writing, print, computers—is reconstructed in all its complexity, we can see that a 
straightforward narrative of technological advance or historical “ruptures” due to 
technology is not viable. (p. 18)
Although such complex histories are unlikely to ever be fully reconstructed, Haas points to 
the corrective potential in resisting narratives of progress.  Similar to Bolter and Grusin’s 
(1999) theory of remediation, the method Haas uses shows the effects of older technologies 
on the creation and use of newer ones (and, as Bolter and Grusin point out, newer 
technologies also affect older ones).  Haas details specific instances of collaboration and 
dissent among individuals and communities that result in the creation of a new technology 
that draws on certain aspects of older technologies and practices but not others.  In other 
words, new technologies are neither complete breaks from the past, nor logical extensions 
of earlier forms, but an ever-evolving mixture of tradition and innovation.  
The complex history that Haas recounts in Writing Technology traces the various 
revisions of a graphical interface for the Andrew computer system at Carnegie Mellon. 
This system was intended to be used by all students and faculty, and therefore went through 
substantial testing and design.  She argues that even seemingly mundane issues like the 
design of a scrollbar are often contested and uses the controversy that erupted among the 
design team over this issue to illustrate the various facets of the historical-genetic approach. 
Yet, because scrollbars have become invisible through years of successful use, users can 
easily assume that scrollbar design was dictated by common sense and quickly 
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standardized.  In detailing these various decisions and the motivations behind them, Haas 
(1996) provides a model for critically reflecting on technology, one that insists on making 
visible the role of people working “within a social context” (p. 140).  Once the role of 
people has been made clear, then we can see that “[c]omputer tools are not self-
determining, nor is their design inevitable” (p. 140).  Following Haas, I also maintain that 
successful computer technology has not benefited from a charmed destiny, and its 
designers have not found the “right” ways for people and computers to interact. 
Conversely, Engelbart’s NLS computer did not disappear solely because its designers 
developed “wrong” or ineffective ways for people and computers to interact.  Instead of 
“right” and “wrong” there is only the presence of technologies and people with specific 
histories, beliefs, theories, features, and goals, all of which add up to produce the outcomes 
with which we are familiar.  
In short, historical study of the development of these artifacts and their uses 
provides a way of understanding how present use is structured by the past.  Moving even 
further back in time than Haas’s study from the 1980s reveals that, beyond scrollbars and 
menu designs, even more basic assumptions about writing with computers were once 
contested.  Exploring the history of these controversies shows us what we are ignoring 
when we take these configurations for granted—when we wrongly assume that they are the 
products of a rational process of fair competition enacted to determine the “best” tools for 
writing.  
The On-Line System
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In a packed auditorium at the 1968 Fall Joint Computer Conference, Douglas 
Engelbart prepared to demonstrate the computer system his team had developed at the 
Augmentation Research Center (ARC).  Sitting in front of a monitor and keyboard 
connected to the computer processor miles away at ARC, Engelbart began the 
demonstration, speaking into a headset microphone as his image was projected onto a large 
screen for the audience.  Additionally, the video projection often showed a split screen, 
with the monitor’s output in the top half and video of Engelbart in the lower half.  At 
several points during the demonstration, the video showed Engelbart’s colleagues who 
were at ARC as they exhibited other aspects of the NLS.3  Video conferencing in the 
modern age of the internet remains technically tricky, and in 1968 this setup was sure to 
impress an audience of computer experts, many of whom still worked with computers that 
had no screen and were operated by punch cards or modified typewriters that punched 
holes in paper tape.  During this “mother of all demos,” as it has often been called (Levy, 
1994), Engelbart introduced the mouse, which was invented at ARC, and a device to the 
left of the keyboard called the five-key chord keyset that could be used to type or input 
commands according to a binary pattern that produced each letter of the alphabet (see 
figure 1).  
3 Video clips of this presentation may be found, at the time of this writing, at 
<http://sloan.stanford.edu/mousesite/1968Demo.html> or <http://invisiblerevolution.net/68-demo.html>.
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Figure 1. Keyset, keyboard, and mouse controls for the NLS 
<http://www.bootstrap.org/chronicle/pix/pix.html>
To demonstrate the use of these devices, Engelbart did some quick typing and editing 
within the writing application, which organized all sentences into hierarchical outlines and 
contained hypertext links.  He selected links by typing the “jump” command with the 
keyset, clicked on text with the mouse and used the keyset to rapidly edit that text.  In 
addition to the text-manipulation and real-time interaction, Engelbart and his team showed 
the audience large portions of code, also written in the hierarchical outline form.  
ARC intended for this demonstration to interest a wider number of people and 
institutions in associating themselves with the NLS and its technologies, and to stabilize the 
existing connections it had with its funders—NASA and the Pentagon’s Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (ARPA).  Many people were excited by the demonstration, but 
ultimately the reaction disappointed Engelbart.  No immediate orders for the NLS were 
forthcoming, and no other computer research projects began implementing the structured 
writing environment or the chord keyset.
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Ten years later, the NLS had lost its funding from ARPA and was sold to Tymshare 
Inc., who employed Engelbart and a few ARC researchers who hadn’t already moved on to 
nearby Xerox PARC.  It was then sold to McDonnell Douglas in 1984, and Engelbart’s 
laboratory subsequently closed in 1989.  Some elements of the NLS have since become 
standard computer features, such as the mouse, hypertext, on-line collaboration, and easily-
searchable document repositories.  Others, of course, remain as strange and off-putting as 
novice users in the 1960s found them, especially the chord keyset and the writing 
application that forced all text into hierarchical outlines.  It is tempting to look back at the 
1968 demonstration with modern practices in mind and suggest that we could have arrived 
where we are at now much sooner if the NLS had become the dominant office computer of 
the late 1970s and 1980s.  Of course, the converse perspective is also tempting—we do not 
use the chord keyset, or type all our text into rigid outlines, and so the NLS appropriately 
failed due to these unwanted elements.  Interpreting the history of the NLS in terms of this 
binary—thwarted success vs. appropriate failure—leads to more traditional narratives of 
technological development where ideas and artifacts somehow have an intrinsic value that 
is either recognized or ignored by developers and consumers.  Following the work of recent 
historians of technology (Bazerman, 1999; Bruce & Rubin, 1993; Haas, 1996; Latour, 
1996a), I want to avoid using traditional narratives to tell the history of the NLS, focusing 
instead on the situated interactions between different people and artifacts over time.  Rather 
than presupposing some historical value or ancestry, I attempt to position the various 
technical features of the NLS within networks of people, their beliefs about computers and 
work, their working practices, and the material affordances of the computer technology.
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The Augmentation Project
Although the NLS is the result of a large network of funders, researchers, 
engineers, and users, I want to start mapping this network with a close look at the 
augmentation project begun by Douglas Engelbart.  That project led Engelbart to form the 
Augmentation Research Center laboratory within Stanford Research International (SRI), 
where the NLS was created.  “Augmentation,” as Engelbart used the term, referred to using 
artifacts and training to increase the ability of humans to solve complex problems rapidly. 
The problems that concerned Engelbart went beyond strictly mathematical number 
crunching (what computers were typically used for in the 1950s when Engelbart became 
interested in augmentation).  In a 1986 interview, he described the kind of complexity he 
wanted to address:
I remembered reading about the people that would go in and lick malaria in an area, 
and then the population would grow so fast and the people didn’t take care of the 
ecology, and so pretty soon they were starving again, because they not only 
couldn’t feed themselves, but the soil was eroding so fast that the productivity of 
the land was going to go down. So it’s a case that the side effects didn’t produce 
what you thought the direct benefits would. I began to realize it’s a very complex 
world. If you can pick a target that if you succeed will indeed produce the benefit 
you wanted, or it might also have negative side effects that are going to counteract 
the benefit. (Lowood & Adams, 1997, interview 1) 
Engelbart described thinking about these complex problems in the 1950s because he had 
recently become engaged and landed a steady job.  With his two main goals for life 
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achieved, he began wondering about the purpose of his life, and what good he could do in 
the world.  Already convinced that the solutions to specific problems often led to less than 
beneficial results, he had a revelation about improving the means with which people 
approach such problems.  Using computers to handle the many variables involved in such 
complex problems, people could better predict and counter the unexpected side effects of 
potential solutions.  As he described at length:
The complexity/urgency factor had transcended what humans can cope with. It 
suddenly flashed that if you could do something to improve human capability to 
deal with that, then you’d really contribute something basic. That just resonated. 
Then it unfolded rapidly. I think it was just within an hour that I had the image of 
sitting at a big CRT screen with all kinds of symbols [familiar to him from his work 
with radar during WWII], new and different symbols, not restricted to our old ones. 
The computer could be manipulating, and you could be operating all kinds of things 
to drive the computer. The engineering was easy to do; you could harness any kind 
of a lever or knob, or buttons, or switches, you wanted to, and the computer could 
sense them, and do something with it.
I also really got a clear picture that one’s colleagues could be sitting in other 
rooms with similar work stations, tied to the same computer complex, and could be 
sharing and working and collaborating very closely. And also the assumption that 
there’d be a lot of new skills, new ways of thinking that would evolve. Within a 
matter of hours, that image came, and I just said, “AHA!” I very rarely make my 
decisions in such a definite way. That one just unfolded and went “Bam!,” and I 
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just said, “Boy, that’s it. That just fills all kinds of different needs.” (Lowood & 
Adams, 1997, interview 1) 
Engelbart deployed this narrative of a “flash” of inspiration during a personal search for his 
purpose in the world in many interviews over the course of his life.  Thierry Bardini 
(2000), in his history of Engelbart and the NLS, has noted how often others ascribed 
visionary status to Engelbart (as a reason for their support or opposition), showing 
Engelbart’s success in linking his work with this narrative of inspiration.  
Furthermore, Engelbart himself described how this story seemed to move him to 
action as well.  In 1955 Engelbart earned his PhD in electrical engineering and in 1962 
submitted a report titled: “Augmenting Human Intellect: A Conceptual Framework” to the 
Air Force Office of Scientific Research, which had funded his work at SRI for three years. 
The report was published the next year in Vistas of Information Handling, in a modified 
form, as “A Conceptual Framework for the Augmentation of Man’s Intellect.”  For the rest 
of his career at SRI and onward, Engelbart remained committed to the concept of 
augmentation presented in that report.  In an interview in 1987, Engelbart admitted to 
becoming disillusioned with his lack of success professionally and considered changing 
projects or professions, but said to himself: “Well, I think with my particular orientation 
about the value I think all this [the NLS and augmentation project] would have to society, 
there is just no way I could give it up” (Lowood & Adams, 1997, interview 3).  Engelbart’s 
main motivation throughout his career, as he describes it, has been this vision of increased 
human effectiveness. 
Augmentation and Activity
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Hearing the term “augmentation” in this context may conjure up images of human-
computer cyborgs with electronic eyes and wires connected to their brains.  In fact, 
Engelbart meant it as a much more general term, referring to almost any aspect of 
cognition.  In the version of the “Conceptual Framework” article published in 1963, 
Engelbart explains his view of human activity:
Individuals who operate effectively in our culture have already been considerably 
“augmented.” Basic human capabilities for sensing stimuli, performing numerous 
mental operations, and communicating with the outside world are put to work in 
our society within a system—an H-LAM/T system—the individual [human] 
augmented by the language, artifacts, and methodology in which he is trained. 
Furthermore, we suspect that improving the effectiveness of the individual as he 
operates in our society should be approached as a system-engineering problem—
that is, the H-LAM/T system should be studied as an interacting whole from a 
synthesis-oriented approach. (1963, p. 8)
For Engelbart, the system consisting of humans and their mental and physical tools was no 
longer adequate to address the problems of the day, and his research program sought ways 
to enhance the system through improvements to the non-human elements of what he 
termed the H-LAM/T system.  Thus, an improvement to language, artifacts, or 
methodology (or improvement in training in these areas) would be an improvement to the 
system as a whole, and improving elements as a system is better than focusing solely on 
one. “The important thing to appreciate here is that a direct new innovation in one 
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particular capability can have far-reaching effects throughout the rest of your capability 
hierarchy” (p. 7).4  
There are significant similarities between Engelbart’s view of human activity and 
performance and Lev Vygotsky’s (1978) theories of mediated activity.  In Vygotsky’s 
theories, tool use plays a large role; he posits that it is only through tools (also referred to 
as mediational means) that humans interact with their environment.  While this is most 
obvious in cases involving physical tools like hammers, language operates as a mental 
“tool” under this theory, mediating our thoughts and interactions with others.  These tools 
shape our activity, often to the extent that they change the nature of an activity that was 
previously mediated with different tools.  James Wertsch (1998) uses the example of pole 
vaulting to illustrate Vygotsky’s findings, turning to the introduction of fiberglass poles to 
the sport.  Several critics of fiberglass poles claimed that, as opposed to bamboo or metal, 
their flexibility drastically altered the practices of pole vaulting, and that with fiberglass, 
the spring of the pole did the work rather than the vaulter  (pp. 43-44).  One former vaulter 
compared vaulting with fiberglass poles to circus work, rather than the “sport” practiced 
with bamboo.  Although in obvious ways the activity remained the same with the new 
poles—a person flung themselves over a high bar—in less obvious ways the activity was 
4 This view could be seen as complementary to some posthuman theories proposing that our human bodies 
are inadequate and must be improved with automated computer technology.  These posthuman theories 
have been critiqued by N. Katherine Hayles (1999), who argues that when people believe that their bodies 
are inadequate and in need of an upgrade, they neglect the way embodiment always affects/shapes 
cognition.  But Engelbart was not suggesting that we need to replace our bodies, in fact, he was always 
conscious of ergonomics and designed in ways that took advantage of human physiology.  In the 1987 
interview he made clear his position on the role of augmentation in relation to standard bodies: 
Lowood: So because of the computer tools alongside all of these cultural tools that existed already
—is that why you chose the word augment? The fact that you’re adding onto a finite base? 
Engelbart: Yes. You’re just augmenting the basic human capability; there already is a fantastic 
system. We have to augment the basic human capability and the computer was just another 
artifact” (Lowood & Adams, 1997, interview 3).
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changed by the new tool and attendant practices as vaulters used the spring of the fiberglass 
pole to fling themselves higher than previously possible.  When Engelbart discusses the 
way “innovations in one particular capability” can affect other capabilities, he is echoing 
Vygotsky’s theory of mediated activity.  
Vygotsky too saw human cognition and activity as a system; people and the 
mediational means they use constitute a single unit for analysis.  Like Engelbart’s “system-
engineering” approach to human activity, Vygotsky argued that the best way to study the 
relation between thinking and speech is not to separate out individual elements, like “a 
chemical analysis of water in which water is decomposed into hydrogen and oxygen,” but 
to maintain attention on the “characteristic[s] of the whole” which are “inherent in the 
phenomenon only as a unified whole” (1978, p. 45).  He argued that his approach would 
search for “units,” which “designates a product of analysis that possesses all the basic 
characteristics of the whole” (emphasis in original, p. 46).  Although Engelbart never 
explicitly stated that he too attempted to begin analysis with these irreducible units, he did 
use the concept of “synergism” to refer to the source of human intelligence, arguing that it 
comes from a “hierarchy of organized functions” that cooperate to create something more 
complex (1962b, p. 18).  We can also see from his dedication to the chord keyset and 
mouse that he saw this pair (together with the NLS and human) as a unit that allowed for 
certain kinds of activity, not optional devices to be mixed and matched according to 
preference.
Further similarities between the two can be illustrated through discussion of an 
experiment on the “development of mediated remembering,” conducted by Vygotsky’s 
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protégé A.N. Leontiev and recounted by Vygotsky (1978, p. 45).  In the experiment, 
children were asked a series of questions and instructed to give rapid one-word answers. 
Several of these questions asked about the color of things.  After running through the 
questions once, constraints were introduced: no color could be mentioned twice and two 
colors were designated as “forbidden.”  After this second, constrained, round the children 
were given colored cards and told the cards would help them win and then asked the 
questions again.  Young children (ages 5-6) had roughly the same number of errors during 
the second and third rounds (without cards and with) but slightly older children (ages 8-9) 
did much better in the third round (with cards) and even older children (10-13) had slightly 
fewer errors in the second round (without cards) and almost none in the third (with cards). 
These older children used the cards to mediate their responses—removing the cards 
depicting the “forbidden” colors and turning over each colored card as they used that color 
in a response, ensuring that they would not repeat a color.  Of the results, Vygotsky said 
that the 
[preschool age] child is not capable of mastering his behavior by organizing special 
stimuli.  The colored cards that might help the child in his task do not increase to an 
considerable extent the effectiveness of this operation.  Although they act as 
stimuli, they do not acquire an instrumental function. (1978, p. 45)
Of the school-aged children, “external stimuli raises the effectiveness of the child’s activity 
considerably” (p. 45) while in adults there were few errors in either task because “the 
external sign that school children require has been transformed into an internal sign 
produced by the adults as a means of remembering” (p. 45).  Using Engelbart’s language, 
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we could say that in school-aged children, the “artifact” aspect of the H-LAM/T is 
dominant in this activity, while for the adult, the “language” aspect is dominant (this 
category, for Engelbart, represents all of conceptual thought).  With his augmentation 
projects, Engelbart sought to create computer tools that would allow people to surpass their 
limits in some aspects of their H-LAM/T system, like the schoolchildren using the cards to 
successfully accomplish a task that was too difficult without.  Furthermore, Engelbart was 
interested in the process that Vygotsky called “internalization,” where activities previously 
mediated by external artifacts come to be mediated by internal signs (as in the case of the 
adults who no longer needed the color cards).  Engelbart’s interest, however, leaned more 
toward instrumental value—humans who had internalized a set of processes previously 
made possible by technology could then be further augmented by new technology that 
would allow previously unimagined activity.  As will be discussed at greater length later 
on, Engelbart’s orientation toward internalization led to people requiring significant 
amounts of training to “internalize” the operations of the NLS—training that many 
potential users resisted.
Augmentation Hardware
In keeping with his initial flash of inspiration about computer technology, Engelbart 
began research into human augmentation by developing new kinds of technologies, which 
led to research on training and language issues (the other two parts of his H-LAM/T model) 
related to using the new hardware and software.  In his second report to the Air Force 
Office of Scientific Research in 1965, Engelbart recounted his research on technologies 
and practices for communicating with computers.  After listing the various features of 
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voice, handwriting, typewriters, stenotypy, and telegraphy, Engelbart concluded that a new 
technology could be formed to take advantage of the beneficial elements of stenotypy and 
telegraphy.
The speed of stenotypy is desirable, but the decoding complexity is a disadvantage. 
However, the means by which stenotypy provides its range of signal actions is a 
separate feature that is worth considering. This depression of two or more keys per 
hand stroke is often termed “chording.” 
The telegraph key is undesirable because of its limited signal actions and 
the difficulty in getting more speed even with sophisticated coding. The notion of 
one-handed transmission, however, is appealing, especially in situations where the 
human would like to do other tasks concurrent with transmitting. (1965, p. 10) 
Thus, the five-key chord keyset was developed to take advantage of “chording” as well as 
“one-handed transmission.”  Engelbart vividly described his experiments with the chord 
keyset, intending to show, perhaps, that concurrent tasks could be done while transmitting.
As a start in this direction, I have done some experimenting with using the 31 
unique five-finger chords for transmitting English text.  I have devised and learned 
a five-key code capable of duplicating the upper and lower case typewriter 
character repertoire and can transmit at a rate of almost 35 words per minute.  Most 
of my practice has come by drumming my fingers on any handy surface—copying 
road signs as I drive or trying to copy people I happen to be listening to during the 
day.  (1965, p. 11)
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Curiously, although Engelbart noted that “training is relatively easy” for a standard 
typewriter, and that “coupling to a computer . . . is straightforward” (1965, p. 9), he did not 
compare the typewriter with the keyset.  Engelbart wrote in detail later in the report about 
his use of a typewriter for his “thinking work” (1965, p. 24), and did not mention 
switching, or attempting to switch, to a keyset for such work.  It seems that even at this 
early stage before the mouse that would become the keyset’s partner, the typewriter 
keyboard and keyset were seen as complementary, or at least two devices that coexist 
because they were used in different circumstances (writing and computer communication). 
Not everyone at ARC continued to rely on traditional keyboards for writing work; John 
Markoff (2005) reported that 
Some of the [ARC] team even mastered the art of typing using the chord-key set 
exclusively—one young programmer was able to type more than 50 words per 
minute. To a world that would not see the introduction of the IBM Correcting 
Selectric II typewriter until 1973, it made for a stunning display of text editing at 
hyperspeed. (pp. 77-78) 
Such a feat foreshadows the problems the keyset would face with regard to widespread use, 
since the very novelty of this programmer typing exclusively with the keyset reveals the 
unlikeliness of others duplicating his actions.
Bootstrapping 
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Engelbart continually emphasized that his interest in augmentation was directed 
toward facilitating new, useful, and efficient activities—not solely developing computer 
technology.  In the article published in the conference proceedings for the 1968 
demonstration, Engelbart and his colleague William English declared their goal to be the 
creation of an “augmentation system,” which “includes concern not only for the technology 
of providing interactive computer service, but also for changes both in ways of 
conceptualizing, visualizing, and organizing working material, and in procedures and 
methods for working individually and cooperatively” (1968, p. 395).  Their efforts to 
research changes in procedures and methods of work were more than merely abstract.  For 
instance, rather than simply creating the possibility for real-time collaboration with the 
NLS computer system by networking the terminals, the researchers at ARC set up six 
displays at a large table to be used during their meetings.  Each screen showed the same 
thing, with one person assuming full control and the other participants each using a mouse 
to manipulate a pointer on the screen (Engelbart, Watson, & Norton, 1973).    
Engelbart’s concern for augmentation was enacted within ARC in several ways, the 
most prominent being the strategy of “bootstrapping.”  Originally referring to the way 
relatively simple software routines initiate the more complicated software that starts up a 
computer (now simply called “booting”), the ARC researchers employed this term to 
describe the process of using the tools they made in the lab to enable the creation of even 
more useful tools.
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Within ARC we do as much work as possible using the range of online capabilities 
offered. We serve not only as researchers, but also as the subjects for the analysis 
and evaluation of the augmentation system that we have been developing.
Consequently, an important aspect of the augmentation work done within 
ARC is that the techniques being explored are implemented, studied, and evaluated 
with the advantage of intensive everyday usage. We call this research and 
development strategy “bootstrapping.” 
In our experience, complex man-machine systems can evolve only in a 
pragmatic mode, within real-work environments where there is an appropriate 
commitment to conscious, controlled, exploratory evolution. (Engelbart, Watson, & 
Norton, 1973, p. 12) 
Initially, the “bootstrapping” methodology seemed imposed by funding constraints rather 
than deliberate choice; as mentioned, in an early report Engelbart described his efforts to 
learn the binary code for the chord keyset by tapping his fingers on his leg while listening 
to people or driving (Letter to Robert Taylor dated April 5, 1963; Box 6).  At that point, 
there were no other researchers or money for training many other people, and Engelbart 
himself needed to test the technology.  But by 1973, bootstrapping had become a deliberate 
strategy, one that underscored that the NLS was a usable system.  
Two aspects of the bootstrapping methodology described here were crucial to the 
creation and shape of the NLS.  First, bootstrapping was a form of controlled evolution; 
functioning NLS computer components enabled more efficient work on successive systems 
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in addition to creating new possibilities for activities that were not imaginable before the 
NLS.  As Engelbart described it in 1987:
You build something that you can use.  You start using it and then you improve that 
and build a different one.  That was the projection.  I would start with text-
processing by the computer that could help me do the text work.  [The NLS] 
composes reports and memos along the way, and software [i.e. writing code]. 
(Lowood & Adams, 1997, interview 2) 
As a writing researcher, I find it of interest (and also surprising) that Engelbart saw writing 
(or at least “text-processing”) as a foundational activity that would support further co-
evolution between humans and computers.  This view, although resonant with that of many 
within rhetoric and composition, put ARC at odds with others within the computer research 
community in the late 1960s who rarely addressed writing as an activity worth supporting. 
For instance, in 1961 a program was written for the PDP-1 computer at MIT that 
functioned as a crude text editor, allowing a user to type into the computer and print using a 
Flexowriter, but without a display.  Its name was “Expensive Typewriter,” and remained a 
kind of joke (Waldrop, 2001, p. 188).  The second important consequence of bootstrapping 
was that Engelbart and the others at ARC positioned themselves as the “subjects” of their 
own experiments with computer technology, and thus saw themselves as the “users” of the 
computers they were also designing for others.  Their success with the NLS became 
evidence to them that others would meet similar success.  Designers often have difficulty 
occupying user and designer roles simultaneously, and the ARC researchers were no 
different in this respect.  
54
Writing as Strategic Augmentation
As conceived by the researchers at ARC, bootstrapping was a lengthy process, but 
one that could provide tangible results along the way if approached reflectively and 
strategically.  Beginning the bootstrapping process with writing technology was a primary 
strategy, as Engelbart recounted:
Just learning how to harness, to integrate all this technology into our way of 
thinking and working, would take a long, long time. But some paths that you would 
follow would get to the benefits and effectiveness much sooner than others. The 
strategy was important to me. These are things that made so much difference. I’d 
say, “I’m starting to work with documents, with the support of expositional 
communication and thinking and developing an argument that can be 
communicated, and with integrating lots of other people’s thoughts and 
considerations.” That would be right at the heart of how you learn from experience 
and integrate it. (Lowood & Adams, 1997, interview 3)
“Support of expositional communication” took several forms in the NLS.  Because it was a 
networked, time-sharing computer system, the NLS enabled real-time and asynchronous 
collaboration on text documents (both “expositional communication” and programming 
code).  Several users could be logged into any one computer at a time, and users from 
different computers could communicate through the networking protocols.  Users could 
also leave messages for each other, either in a direct form like email, or as a note appended 
to a specific section of a document or piece of code.  In these ways, the NLS supported 
collaboration on both the programming work necessary to develop more computer 
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software, and also the written work required to receive grants and share the results of their 
augmentation research in publications and at conferences, as well as amongst themselves.
Another form of text support was a “structuring convention” “that would make 
explicit (for both the user and the computer) the various types of network relationships 
among concepts” (Engelbart & English, 1968, p. 398).  Under this convention, all text was 
organized into a hierarchical structure, essentially an outline.  “The principal manifestation 
of this hierarchical structure is the breaking up of text into arbitrary segments called 
‘statements,’ each of which bears a number showing its serial location in the text and its 
‘level’ in an ‘outline’ of the text” (p. 398).  A statement typically consisted of a small 
number of sentences, or even a single sentence, preceded by the marker (e.g., 1B2C, 
indicating its location as the first heading, second subheading, etc.).  Each statement could 
be linked to, since it existed as a separate unit identified with a unique marker. 
Furthermore, the hierarchy of statements in a document could be collapsed or expanded 
according to any level, allowing users in “study” mode to view only “top” level statements 
to get a quick overview of the text, or only expanding one particular section to full detail, 
or any other combination.  View specifications could also be determined by keyword filter, 
where only statements containing the search criteria would be shown.  In a recent article, 
Peter Elbow (2006) makes a similar case for providing readers with just this sort of 
structural flexibility, suggesting that outlines serve as valuable roadmaps for readers.  
I’ve often wished writers of complex books or essays would provide us with the 
one-page condensed outline that they pinned to their wall to keep them from losing 
their way as they wrote.  (Some word processing programs allow you to press a few 
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keys and reduce your text to its outline or headline form.  Wouldn’t it be nice if this 
were available to readers?). (p. 630)
Engelbart, too, saw this sort of roadmap as crucial for readers navigating hypertext 
environments.5
The structuring convention was used for all texts written with the NLS, 
representing a significant aspect of the bootstrapping method.  In 1968, Engelbart and 
English reported that “[w]e have found it to be fairly universal that after an initial period of 
negative reaction in reading explicitly structured material, one comes to prefer it to material 
printed in the normal form” (p. 399).  Later accounts of the structuring convention present 
differing opinions though, especially about writing with the NLS.  In a 1992 interview, 
William English explained that the structure for writing was important for the speed of the 
system, but also acknowledged that not all people preferred to write in the highly structured 
way.  He admitted that although he was partial to it, “many people never structure, some 
people after the fact.  I personally like it: I use it all the time. . . . Anything I write, I do the 
structured outline and start filling in the words” (qtd. in Bardini, 2000, p. 144).  Another 
ARC researcher, Charles Irby, found the structured writing to be a “limitation,” saying in a 
1992 interview that “It’s a powerful organizing methodology, but it’s also limiting for 
certain kinds of things, and it caused this certain kind of stilted writing style, because you 
knew that people would cut out levels of detail and view it in different ways than you had 
originally sequentially wrote it” (qtd. in Bardini, 2000, p. 144).  A computer researcher 
outside of the ARC lab named John McCarthy, using the NLS as part of the ARPANET in 
the early 1970s, also found the structured text restrictive after attempting to break up a 
5 Anders Fagerjord’s (2005) article in the online journal Kairos provides this feature for readers.
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research paper into hierarchical statements, and “decided structure was imposing an 
unnecessary restriction on his thought process” (Markoff, 2005, p. 171).  For English, 
structures continue to facilitate his writing, while for Irby and McCarthy the structure 
presented a rhetorical challenge.  Although Engelbart saw the NLS as primarily facilitating 
the organization and display of non-linear ideas, it seemed to thwart the goals of writers 
(like Irby) who saw their ideas within traditional sequential structures as well as writers 
less accustomed to such strict organizational requirements (like McCarthy).  These writers 
were required to “co-evolve” with the NLS rather than provided an option to write without 
the structured convention.  Again, Engelbart was focused on bootstrapping leading to 
increased complexity, and he saw non-sequential, networked concepts affording more 
complex ideas, or at least the presentation of more complex ideas.  Providing a choice 
would have given people an “out,” a tempting option to continue working in familiar ways. 
Through bootstrapping, augmentation was forced, as opposed to market-driven, 
where consumers could choose to use these augmentation technologies by purchasing 
them, or by simply turning on or off the features they preferred.  In terms of distributing 
innovation amongst large groups of people, forced adoption of discontinuous technologies 
has rarely led to desirable results.  Familiarity with the augmentation project and 
Engelbart’s attempts to test new ways of working can make one sympathetic with his 
decision to force the structuring convention, but in hindsight it seems remarkable that he 
was able to ignore the resistance to writing in this way from within ARC and the small 
ARPA community.  One possible explanation is that his own experiences with the NLS 
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were so persuasive and complementary to his writing style that he believed once people 
had used the NLS they too would eventually experience something similar.
Writing Theories
Engelbart had been thinking about supporting writing with computer technology as 
early as 1962, before the Augmentation Research Center was started and several years 
before the NLS was created.  In his 1963 published version of that report, he used the 
example of writing a memo to illustrate his arguments about the goal-directed activity of 
humans.  
When a person writes a memo (a reasonably high-order process), he makes use of 
many processes as subprocesses that are common to other high-order processes. For 
example, he makes use of planning, composing, dictating. The process of writing a 
memo is utilized as a subprocess within many different processes of a still higher 
order, such as organizing a committee, changing a policy, and so on. (p. 5)
If the memo is short and simple, the first three processes may be of the 
explicit-human type (i.e., the memo may be planned, developed and composed 
within the mind), and the last two [producing hard copy and distributing the memo] 
of the composite type. If it is complex, involving a good deal of careful planning 
and development, then all of the subprocesses may be of the composite type (at 
least including the use of pencil and paper artifacts), and there may be many 
different applications of some of the process capabilities within the total process 
(successive drafts, revised plans). (p. 6)
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Engelbart’s theory of composition, where writing consists of several “lower-order” 
processes (like planning and composing) consisting of human capabilities or composites of 
human and artifact capabilities and is goal-directed (write a memo in order to organize a 
committee), bears some resemblance to Flower and Hayes’ (1981) cognitive process 
model.  In their article “A Cognitive Process Theory of Writing,” they describe the four 
main points that constitute their model, several of which align closely with the model 
described by Engelbart above:
1. The process of writing is best understood as a set of distinctive thinking processes 
which writers orchestrate or organize during the act of composing.
2. These processes have a hierarchical, highly embedded organization in which any 
given process can be embedded within any other.
3. The act of composing itself is a goal-directed thinking process, guided by the 
writer’s own growing network of goals.
4. Writers create their own goals in two key ways: by generating both high-level goals 
and supporting sub-goals which embody the writer’s developing sense of purpose, 
and then, at times, by changing major goals or even establishing entirely new ones 
based on what has been learned in the act of writing. (p. 366)
One key difference between the two is that Engelbart describes a linear writing process, 
what Flower and Hayes refer to as the “stage model” (p. 367), where planning comes 
before composing which comes before revision, and Flower and Hayes argue that these 
processes exist within a hierarchy and can be executed at any time.  A writer can compose 
a sentence, revise it, return to planning, then do further revision all within a matter of 
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minutes.  Even with this difference, both models offer extensive description of writing as a 
goal-directed activity.  For instance, Flower and Hayes identify an overarching process, 
called the monitor, that “functions as a writing strategist which determines when the writer 
moves from one process to the next.  For example, it determines how long a writer will 
continue generating ideas before attempting to write prose” (p. 374).  Engelbart uses the 
term “executive function,” common to cognitive theories, to identify a similar process.  The 
executive function, he writes, stems “from habit, strategy, rules of thumb, prejudice, 
learned method, intuition, unconscious dictates, or combinations thereof, to utilize the 
appropriate subprocess capabilities in a particular sequence and timing” (1963, p. 6).  For 
both theories, these overarching processes direct writers, managing the subprocesses 
required to accomplish writing goals.  A closer examination of cognitive process models of 
writing, and the problems others have found with them, may provide clues to the limits of 
Engelbart’s and others’ concepts of human activity in this period.
Flower and Hayes describe writing as a goal-directed activity, responding to 
critiques that writing is an exploratory process and that writers do not know what they will 
write until they have written.  They argue instead that goals and plans “are created as 
people compose, throughout the entire process. This means that they do not emerge full-
blown as the result of ‘pre-writing.’ Rather, as we will show, they are created in close 
interaction with ongoing exploration and the growing text” (p. 378).  They also note that 
people often forget their “working” goals once they have been met, and therefore see the 
writing process as one of unstructured exploration rather than goal-directed activity, which 
is why their research method uses think-aloud protocols to capture those fleeting goals. 
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Flower and Hayes put special emphasis on this process: “In the act of writing, people 
regenerate or recreate their own goals in the light of what they learn” (p. 381).
Their view of goal-setting and planning differs from that of scholars working in the 
tradition of ethnomethodology, such as Lucy Suchman (1987).  Working as an 
anthropologist in the field of Human-Computer Interaction, Suchman claims that plans 
only exist as artifacts that allow us to reason, after the fact, about our actions.  Our situated 
activity, what happens in the moment, “is essentially transparent to us as actors” (p. 39). 
To illustrate, Suchman discusses how a person in a canoe might traverse river rapids. This 
person might make a plan beforehand, but will respond to the local situation, especially the 
river conditions, during the trip rather than slavishly following the plan: “The purpose of 
the plan in this case is not to get your canoe through the rapids, but rather to orient you in 
such a way that you can obtain the best possible position from which to use those embodied 
skills on which, in the final analysis, your success depends” (p. 52).  In other words, plans 
don’t dictate activity; people respond to local and unexpected conditions in situated ways 
while often (but not always) remaining oriented toward their goal(s), which in this case 
could be survival, or an exciting trip, or any number of combinations.  Flower and Hayes’ 
model, on the other hand, maintains that writers are directed by processes and scripts that 
lead them to achieve their overarching rhetorical goals (in their example, to describe one’s 
job to a specific audience). 
Within composition studies Marilyn Cooper and Michael Holzman (1983) have 
questioned Flower and Hayes’ depiction of the cognitive processes of goal-directed 
writing.  They target the “talk-aloud” protocol used by Flower and Hayes, claiming that 
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“While actions resulting from cognitive processes can be observed (although such 
observation is itself not free of problems), the processes themselves simply cannot be” (p. 
285).  People themselves do not have access to their cognitive processes, they argue, and 
the artificiality of the talk-aloud method renders it too problematic.  Returning to 
Suchman’s (1987) work, the processes of situated activity, that is, writing an essay, are 
invisible to “us as actors” (p. 39) and a narration of someone’s thoughts while writing does 
not produce an explanation of cognitive processes.  
Furthermore, Cooper and Holzman contend that Flower and Hayes were too loose 
in their terminology, using “goal” and “plan” interchangeably.  Drawing on the work of 
Schank and Abelson (1977), Cooper and Holzman argue that the differences between 
goals, plans, and scripts matter because without these distinctions anything can be called a 
goal and the interplay between goals and plans to achieve those goals becomes too tidy.  To 
illustrate what is gained through more rigorous definitions, Cooper and Holzman ask:
But do we want to say, as Flower and Hayes’ thoroughgoing equation of plans and 
goals implies, that all of a writer’s goals automatically call up associated plans? 
Isn’t it instead the case that achieving a goal involves not simply the setting of sub-
goals (instrumental goals) but more importantly involves knowing what actions 
might be useful in achieving the goal, knowing how to choose which actions to 
take, and knowing how these actions can be arranged into a coherent series? . . . 
With Flower and Hayes, the question of how writers are to develop plans to 
accomplish their goals remains unanswered, and the scripts that skilled writers 
unconsciously use are not described. (p. 288) 
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This same critique may be applied to Engelbart’s description of memo-writing (introduced 
earlier): “When a person writes a memo (a reasonably high-order process), he makes use of 
many processes as subprocesses that are common to other high-order processes” (1963, p. 
6).  Despite the somewhat confusing repetition of the word “process,” Engelbart too depicts 
writing as an activity consisting of instrumental sub-goals, rather than, as Cooper and 
Holzman suggest, “a matter of knowledge” (p. 288).  Presumably, these sub-goals are set 
by the “executive capability” that directs writers based on their knowledge (as he says, 
“intuition” and “habits”), but Engelbart never quite puts it this way.  
Cooper and Holzman’s critique, that Flower and Hayes do not address the precise 
ways writers develop plans and scripts to direct their writing activity, applies equally to 
most software designers.  As argued by the interaction designer Barbara Mirel (2003), 
software designers too often focus on features that address users’ discrete tasks, without 
supporting their open-ended problem solving and patterns of inquiry.  From this 
perspective, complex work, like writing, cannot be broken down so easily without ignoring 
the situated knowledge writers need to produce effective results. 
Aside from these critiques, however, Engelbart does produce accounts of writing 
with computer technology that complement Flower and Hayes’ depictions of the situated 
creation and revision of both written content and goals.  Because his theories of activity led 
to a fairly sophisticated account of the many processes involved in writing, he was able to 
imagine different material tools that would enhance (augment) those processes.  Flower 
and Hayes, on the other hand, did not address writing technologies, and, as Haas (1996) 
notes, they focused almost exclusively on cognitive processes, even for acts such as 
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“translating” where writers “actually render their meanings into material artifacts” (p. 38). 
By focusing solely on translating as a mental phenomenon, Flower and Hayes miss the 
mediating role that writing technologies play.  
In 1963, Engelbart addressed artifacts and their effects on writing processes by 
discussing a hypothetical writing machine that essentially offered what we now call “cut 
and paste” functionality, allowing writers to select bits of written text and copy them to a 
new place within the same document or into a new one.  In his description of the 
hypothetical machine, he argues that it 
permits you to use a new process of composing text. For instance, trial drafts can 
rapidly be composed from rearranged excerpts of old drafts, together with new 
words or passages which you insert by hand typing. Your first draft may represent a 
free outpouring of thoughts in any order, with the inspection of foregoing thoughts 
continuously stimulating new considerations and ideas to be entered. If the tangle 
of thoughts represented by the draft becomes too complex, you can compile a 
reordered draft quickly.  It would be practical for you to accommodate more 
complexity in the trails of thought you might build in search of the path that suits 
your needs.
You can integrate your new ideas more easily, and thus harness your 
creativity more continuously, if you can quickly and flexibly change your working 
record. If it is easier to update any part of your working record to accommodate 
new developments in thought or circumstance, you will find it easier to incorporate 
more complex procedures in your way of doing things. (1963, p. 7) 
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These paragraphs depict writing in a way that illustrates the generative effects of local and 
situated goal setting described by Flower and Hayes.  This new machine facilitated easy 
revision (or at least easy re-arrangement) by giving writers more freedom to compose on 
the page rather than in their heads, since what was on the page could be quickly changed. 
However, as discussed in the next chapter, Engelbart often conflated his preferred methods 
of “knowledge work” with universal human activity, seen in this case by his implicit 
assumption that when re-arrangement of written text is slow, writers will not do it, or won’t 
arrive at complex “trails of thought.”  Furthermore, in using the second-person to address 
readers, Engelbart universalizes a kind of writing process that may very likely sound 
foreign to many.  Engelbart himself may have valued a tool that allowed for the free 
outpouring of thoughts, but not all writers, not even modern ones with word processors, 
prefer to write this way.
The similarities between Flower and Hayes’ and Engelbart’s conceptions of the 
cognitive activity involved in writing are not merely coincidental.  Flower and Hayes’ work 
explicitly builds on that of computer science and cognitive psychology researchers Allen 
Newell and Herbert Simon.  As Hayes (2005) describes it, the general structure of his and 
Flower’s cognitive process model of writing, “that is, the top-level division of the model 
into task environment, memory, and cognitive processes is borrowed quite directly from 
Newell and Simon’s (1972) cognitive architecture” (p. 51).  Engelbart too was greatly 
influenced by similar theories of information processing and cybernetics from the 1950s. 
In constructing the framework for his augmentation research agenda, he describes the unit 
of analysis in systemic terms as well: “Basic human capabilities for sensing stimuli, 
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performing numerous mental operations, and communicating with the outside world are put 
to work in our society within a system—an H-LAM/T system—the individual [human] 
augmented by the language, artifacts, and methodology in which he is trained” (1963, p. 8). 
Instead of focusing on each of these elements separately, Engelbart, like Flower and Hayes, 
argued that researchers should first strive to understand how the elements of the system 
function together as a whole.   
Early Computer-Assisted Writing Efforts
By 1965, but prior to the structured text editor for the NLS, Engelbart had designed 
and begun to write with an earlier computer writing system, one that was off-line and 
called the “Z-code” system.  Although it differed in design from the hypothetical writing 
machine described earlier, it did not differ much in practice.  Because the Z-code system 
existed before the Internet, the terms on- or off-line refer not to a network connection, but 
to working “live” or not with a computer.  Off-line meant typing something onto paper-
tape or some other storage system that would later be fed into the computer for processing. 
Working on-line meant that the computer responded immediately to user input.  Engelbart 
described his process of writing with an off-line system in terms of efficiency—since he 
didn’t have access to a computer for more than four hours a day during his early research, 
efficiency during on-line time was paramount.
I have long had the habit of doing much of my “thinking” work on a typewriter, 
when the nature of the subject permitted it. It occurred to me that if I used a private 
“tapewriter” (our term for a paper-tape-punching typewriter) in my office for such 
thought development I could then feed the paper tape into the computer at the 
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beginning of my on-line working session, and thus take direct advantage of off-line 
thinking time. (1965, p. 24)
Of course, using a new writing system can be anything but efficient, and for Engelbart it 
was no different.  He described using the system to write his second AFOSR report on the 
augmentation project, using his experience as an example of the “bootstrapping technique.”
The [writing] techniques were not smooth: the system would occasionally backfire 
from unwitting violation of a subtle point in convention; many extra hours went 
into composition of some parts because the system was not compatible with the 
thought processes of the author; and considerable constriction was experienced. 
However, the feeling of being tied into a system made a surprising difference in the 
work itself, revealing new kinds of inadequacies, and new kinds of possibilities. 
(1965, p. 3)
Here Engelbart takes on a detached tone, writing about himself in third person and with 
passive voice (“constriction was experienced”).  As test subject for his experiments, but 
also the designer of them, and thus heavily invested in the outcome yielding results 
favorable for his program in augmenting inadequacies, Engelbart occupied several 
potentially conflicting positions at once, both in real life and rhetorically in the report.  Any 
difficulty with the writing system became, in the report, a sign of the potential for 
augmented activity once the human and machine had co-evolved a bit more.  Additionally, 
the conflation of test subject and research director led to a system that could be seen as 
designed to accommodate Engelbart’s idiosyncratic writing methods more than developed 
out of research on composition.
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Writers used to working with on-line text editors can easily understand the 
difficulties Engelbart would have writing text to be processed later by a computer program. 
Rather than just typing text alone, commands too had to be typed in, breaking the writer’s 
concentration to flip back and forth between a complicated “Z-code” and the composition. 
Formatting text involved a relatively simple code—words preceded by a “+” symbol were 
all-caps, words preceded by a “/” had just the first letter capitalized, and words preceded by 
a “<” were underlined.  More intricate editing involved a more complicated code, as 
illustrated by the lines below (the first line of each example represents what was typed, the 
second, bolded, line represents the computer’s output):
EXAMPLE ZC-3
1. /A SIMPLE INSERTION FIRST .Z1I4W(EXAMPLE)Z2I
1. A simple insertion example first.
2. /DELETE AS AN EXAMPLE A GIVEN PRIOR WORD .Z1I7W(Z1W)Z2I
2. Delete as an example a prior word.
3. /REPLACE ONE ITEM WITH ANOTHER .Z1I4W(Z1W WORD)Z2I
4. Replace one word with another.  (Engelbart, 1965, p. 36)
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The first code in each example (Z1) alerts the computer that a command is being issued as 
opposed to text.  The next part gives the position (in number one, the fourth word in the 
sentence).  Next is either the word to be inserted, or a command to delete the word directly 
before the position specified.  Last is the closing command, alerting the computer that the 
command has finished.  Simple character deletions operated using the same complicated Z-
code, so simple typos had to be corrected with at least three characters of code (which 
raises the issue of further compounding one’s errors by inputting the code incorrectly).  
I find it difficult to imagine this code ever becoming transparent, or many writers 
taking the time to learn to use it without frustration.  And indeed, this off-line system was 
replaced as soon as the funds were available to build the on-line system (NLS) presented at 
the 1968 demonstration.  But Engelbart wrote several pages in the 1965 report about the 
potential for such an off-line system, and discussed the kinds of modifications that could 
make it productive for writers.  He began by describing his typewriter writing habits, then 
later showed how the Z-code system complemented and extended those habits.
When I work at a typewriter, the ideas develop as the words flow, and when the 
thinking is hard, the sentences get butchered, with much insertion and deletion 
(penciled arrows and interlineation, etc.), until they say what my current thought 
requires. After a page or two of this, the real ideas begin to emerge and the whole 
thing needs reorganizing. (p. 24)
The Z-code system, like modern word processors, facilitated the reorganization and editing 
required by such “hard thinking,” albeit using less immediate means.  In a passage 
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reminiscent of his 1963 projections of the use of a hypothetical writing machine, Engelbart 
observed that with the Z-code system:
I found that for stretches where the words flowed relatively easily, the system was 
quite helpful, and with later recycling capability [ability to store text on magnetic 
tape for use in other documents/files] I think it will prove to be very helpful over a 
wide range of writing and rewriting applications. For tougher stretches of 
composition, the system got in the way. For some of these sections, I went back to 
more primitive means, a ball-point pen, with lots of scratch-outs, arrows, and 
marginal scribbling and a skilled typist to translate to clean text. This was much 
preferable—and I admit this with no sense of failure regarding the utility of the 
eventual improved Z-code System. (p. 46)
In this passage, Engelbart begins to sketch out the ways such computer-aided writing could 
become an activity different from typewriting.  Compositions requiring concentration on 
ideas and efforts to “get the sentence right” were more easily done with familiar tools and 
methods, which Engelbart found in keeping with his theories.  The computer began to 
change things though with its storage capability, affording writing or re-writing through 
pasting together older texts.  Additionally, combining these results with earlier work in 
“data structuring,” Engelbart points to the need for the structuring conventions mentioned 
in the previous section:
One of the problems in hard-think work is the matter of clarity of presentation of 
preceding work. Cleaned-up copy via frequent recycling is one help, but brevity in 
substantive statements, and clear and concise designation of interrelation among 
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statements are also important. These things can be facilitated with better structuring 
conventions. (p. 46)
Again, it would be easy to criticize Engelbart’s conclusions here as being mostly personal; 
others may have much less trouble achieving clarity in their compositions and requiring 
“concise designation of interrelation among statements” of these writers with the tools 
themselves would likely create friction.  However, given Engelbart’s orientation toward 
bootstrapping, it is also possible to see the program’s imposed structures as constraints that 
encourage writers to stretch and grow.  Disruption, in this sense, provides an opportunity 
for change.  Perhaps not during composition itself, but in later consumption of text 
(through manipulations of the view specifications) or in the interplay of writing and 
computer use.  
Writing with the NLS
By 1968, Engelbart could write with the NLS, not just imagine technologies based 
on his theory of writing, and described his processes in a report for NASA.  The report 
stated that in order to reduce the stress introduced by learning to write with the NLS, it 
should be used for long periods of time, six hours or more, to accustom the writer to its 
features.  The following quoted sections pulled from the report were written by Engelbart 
“at the end of an eight-hour working session” (1969, p. 48).  To begin, Engelbart offers a 
more detailed description of the composition-by-rearrangement process he wrote about in 
1963 and 1965:
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To accommodate and preserve a thought or piece of information that isn’t related to 
the work of the moment, one can very quickly and easily insert a note within the 
structure of a file at such a place that it will neither get in the way nor get lost.
Later, working in another part of the file, he can almost instantly (e.g., 
within two seconds) return to the place where he temporarily is storing such notes, 
to modify or add to any of them. 
As any such miscellaneous thought develops, it is easy (and delightful) to 
reshape the structure and content of its discussion material.
It is also easy and delightful to see a number of initially disconnected notes 
mature to the point where they are ripe to be integrated under one ‘topical’ heading. 
(1969, pp. 48-49).
The searching and rearranging practices described by Engelbart were afforded by the 
hierarchically-structured writing environment of the NLS.  In this system, all documents 
consisted of “statements” that could be linked to and rearranged within a hierarchy, 
essentially making all documents outlines.  Statements were identified by code (e.g., 1A1) 
and could be sentences, a series of sentences, or just a part of a sentence.  This structure 
provided the “connections” between ideas, visually communicating how statements related 
(e.g., statement 1.A.1 is a sub-statement to statement 1, whereas statement 2 is of equal 
weight and connected sequentially to statement 1).  Users could manipulate the hierarchy 
quickly, showing only the top-level statements to provide a quick overview of the 
document, then expanding all the branches of a particular statement for more information.
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Thus, during a writing session with the NLS, users could move disconnected 
statements to a special branch in the hierarchy of the document, and access this branch at 
various times to pull statements from it into the main sections of the document.  In the 
1980s, “outlining programs” appeared with many of these same features.  Fred Kemp 
(1993) explains the premise of these programs in a review of early writing software: 
By allowing the user to work incrementally and then minimizing the pain of 
eventual assembly, organization, and expansion, individual writing environment 
software relieved the writer of much of the toil of manipulating ideas mentally or 
manually with note cards and clumsy outlines. . . . [I]n outlining software, large and 
complex ideas are accumulated from incremental entries. (p. 17)
Engelbart’s earlier hypothesis about the software externalizing part of the creative process 
fits with Kemp’s description.  Of course, Kemp also notes that “Programs that seek to 
externalize some of the functions required of short-term memory may in fact be forcing 
certain students into composing processes alien to them, no matter how natural and 
intuitively correct such processes may have seemed to the programmer” (p. 18).  This 
critique of outlining programs foreshadows the tepid response many gave the NLS and its 
writing software.
Engelbart’s language regarding writing with the NLS seems to imply a loss of 
agency in the writer, one that is even “delightful.”  “Disconnected notes mature” on their 
own, created during different working moments while engaged in other tasks, until the 
writer finds, perhaps through a keyword search, that these notes form a paragraph.  The 
ability to use computer searches to find notes, rather than having to manually look through 
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all notes or maintain mental memories about them is a main affordance of computers that 
separates this form of writing from print technologies.  Developing effective practices for 
exploiting this affordance proved challenging though.  
Interestingly, Engelbart did not give the NLS more agency; he did not say that it 
was the NLS that integrates or matures the notes.  Again, following Engelbart’s constant 
orientation within the augmentation project, the system engaged in these new processes of 
writing—neither the human nor the computer assumed full responsibility.  In his essay in 
the New York Times about writing software for the Macintosh, Steven Johnson (2005a) 
addresses agency with regards to a similar program that collects notes and provides various 
methods of searching.  Johnson found that his process of thinking had been changed by 
using the program.  Rather than always searching for something in particular, he describes 
engaging in a process more akin to brainstorming—looking for possibilities.  He often 
found that the program connected notes that he had not previously seen as related, which 
provided him with an idea.  Johnson addresses the question of agency, wondering who had 
done the thinking:
Now, strictly speaking, who is responsible for that initial idea? Was it me or the 
software? It sounds like a facetious question, but I mean it seriously. Obviously, the 
computer wasn’t conscious of the idea taking shape, and I supplied the conceptual 
glue that linked the London sewers to cell metabolism. But I’m not at all confident I 
would have made the initial connection without the help of the software. The idea 
was a true collaboration, two very different kinds of intelligence playing off each 
other, one carbon-based, the other silicon. (p. 27)
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Johnson’s article suggests that Engelbart’s own working practices with the NLS were not 
wholly idiosyncratic; these techniques really are crucial to the kinds of work modern 
writers do.  Of course, I want to be clear that I am not suggesting Engelbart’s system and 
the one Johnson describes are equivalent, the modern system employs “fuzzy” searching 
and other features not present in the NLS, and these features may very well contribute to 
this modern software’s acceptance where the NLS failed.   
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, reactions to structured writing with the NLS 
were mixed, even within ARC.  Many people found it too restrictive, while others felt the 
structure supported their work.  During the 1980s though, outlining programs with features 
similar to the NLS structuring convention gained modest acceptance among computer 
users.  Jay David Bolter (1991) discusses these “outline processors” in Writing Space, 
linking them to a discussion of the role of “topics” in writing with a computer.  As units of 
text “whose meaning transcends their constituent words” (p. 16), topics, in electronic 
writing, “exist in a writing space that is not only a visual surface but also a data structure in 
the computer” (p. 17).  Although most word processors (circa 1991) allowed writers to 
work with sentences and paragraphs as units (formatting, deleting, moving, etc.), they did 
not allow “a writer to associate a name or a visual symbol with such topical units.  This 
important step lends the unit a conceptual identity.  The unit symbol becomes an abiding 
element in the writer’s thinking and expression, because its constituent words or phrases 
can be put out of sight” (p. 17).  
Bolter’s description of working with text in terms of conceptual units indicated by 
more than paragraph breaks or punctuation closely echoes Engelbart’s arguments for the 
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benefits of the structuring convention.  The alpha-numeric code preceding each statement 
in the NLS outlining hierarchy is precisely the kind of “visual symbol” Bolter sees as so 
valuable to writers.  Even Bolter’s description of writing with an outline processor matches 
Engelbart’s description of writing with the NLS:
A writer can add points to an electronic outline in any order, while the computer 
continually renumbers to reflect additions or deletions. The writer can promote 
minor points to major ones, and the computer will again renumber.  The writer can 
collapse the outline in order to see only those points above a certain level, an action 
that gives an overview of the evolving text.  In short the writer can think globally 
about the text: one can treat topics as unitary symbols and write with those 
symbols, just as in a word processor one writes with words. (p. 17)
Although obviously writers working with print technologies can write outlines, both 
Engelbart and Bolter emphasize that the editing and visual facilities of electronic text make 
more than just a cosmetic difference during writing.  Quickly promoting a minor point to a 
major one, and seeing the resulting text, rather than seeing a drawn arrow indicating that 
upon re-writing the minor point should appear in a different location, produces a 
dramatically different effect.  
While Engelbart only gestured at the advantages of the structuring convention, 
Bolter makes strong claims regarding the outline processor’s benefits.  He argues that 
because of its ability to variously display the structure of textual units (from headings only 
to full paragraphs of text and levels in between), electronic writing turns the “figurative 
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act” of applying structure to text in print to the “literal act” of creating a data structure on 
the computer.  
By defining topical symbols, the writer can, like the programmer or the 
mathematician, abstract himself or herself temporarily from the details of the prose, 
and the value of this abstraction lies in seeing more clearly the structural skeleton of 
the text. . . . the electronic medium can permit us to play creatively with formal 
structures in our writing without abandoning the richness of natural language. (p. 
19)
Engelbart himself valued the ability to “play” with form, breaking up even sentence 
structures so that one sentence would span several hierarchically-structured statements. 
After the 1980s though, these outlining features were incorporated in most word 
processors, and it is not clear how many writers continue to use them.  Although Bolter 
claims that writers “have always known that the identifying and arranging of topics is itself 
an act of writing” (p. 19), writers untrained in these outlining and abstracting practices are 
not likely to know how to make use of them to achieve the benefits Bolter identifies.
Responses to the NLS
Although Engelbart discussed writing practices at length in his reports over the 
years, these discussions were not taken up by the people at the funding agencies to whom 
those reports were addressed.  In 1968 J.C.R. Licklider and Robert Taylor, two of ARC’s 
most important supporters who secured funds for the NLS through ARPA, published an 
article describing their experiences with the NLS.  The article begins with this provocative 
claim: “In a few years, men will be able to communicate more effectively through a 
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machine than face to face” (1999 [1968], p. 97).  Both men had reason to be so bold in their 
statement, since they had both been working for several years to support research and 
development of interactive computers that, among other things, facilitated human 
communication.  Licklider (1988 [1960]), prior to working with Engelbart, had already 
published an article titled “Man-Computer Symbiosis” that speculated on the benefits of 
humans and computers working together, touching on human-to-human communication by 
considering the computer’s potential for facilitating group discussions. “Nowhere, to my 
knowledge,” he notes, “is there anything approaching the flexibility and convenience of the 
pencil and doodle pad or the chalk and blackboard used by men in technical discussion” 
(1988 [1960], p. 138).  
Human communication occupies most of the 1968 article, specifically what 
Licklider and Taylor refer to as “creative communication,” which creates knowledge in the 
interaction rather than a situation where knowledge is simply transmitted, or as they wrote, 
“now we both know a fact that only one of us knew before” (1999 [1968], p. 98). 
Specifically, Licklider and Taylor discuss their impression of using the NLS during a 
meeting with the ARC researchers, where four tables formed a square, with monitors in the 
middle that each participant could see.  
The computer system was a significant aid in exploring the depth and breadth of the 
material.  More detailed information could be displayed when facts had to be 
pinpointed; more global information could be displayed to answer questions of 
relevance and interrelationship.  A future version of this system will make it 
possible for each participant, on his own TV screen, to thumb through the speaker's 
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files as the speaker talks—and thus check out incidental questions without 
interrupting the presentation for substantiation. (p. 100)
What stands out the most to me in Licklider and Taylor’s description of the NLS as a 
communication system is the absence of any description of the production of documents. 
Licklider, like Bush, seemed predisposed toward utopian optimism, and ended the article 
by describing the joys of the “on-line individual” who interacts with people based on 
interests rather than “accidents of proximity” and has opportunities to pursue any career 
since the network provides access to all disciplines and training (p. 110).  In addition, this 
individual’s communication is more efficient and therefore “more enjoyable” (p. 110).  
But many of Engelbart’s most discussed features are not in Licklider’s utopia. 
There is no mention of the way the structured writing convention of the NLS allowed the 
writer to work with more complicated ideas, only discussion of how that convention 
facilitates reading during a meeting.  Nor is there any mention of the way composing with 
the NLS allowed for more free expression and easy subsequent revision.  Nor of the ability 
to extensively search documents on the system, or use that search to collate hasty notes 
written at disparate times.  In their article, Licklider and Taylor depict the NLS as what we 
might now call “groupware,” a system to facilitate group meetings and projects.  In doing 
so, they promote the way the NLS facilitated sharing information, but ignore its role in 
production—the aspect that I’ve suggested was most discontinuous and disruptive with 
traditional ways of working.  As I’ll explore at length in the next chapter, Engelbart and 
ARC had the most trouble interesting others in these aspects of the NLS that they 
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themselves were most attached to.  The new writing procedures described by Engelbart 
were mostly ignored or even evaluated negatively.  
Resisting Augmentation
Writing teachers working with computer technology have long been concerned with 
the tensions between the promise of a particular piece of software and the amount of 
experience or instruction necessary to achieve that promise.  In a special issue of 
Computers and Composition devoted to the evaluation of software, William Condon (1993) 
gave this advice to teachers:
In general, if students cannot master the basics of an application upon first using it 
and become familiar with most of its functions within a week, then it is probably 
too difficult to use in a writing class. Exceptions to this rule should occur only 
when the program delivers especially valuable, unique capabilities. (p. 56)
These kinds of expectations about the ease of software make it unlikely that any radical 
departure from existing practices will be taken up, and Condon provided no criteria with 
which to determine when a program can be taken as an exception.  If users have only spent 
a week working with a program, they probably are not ready to determine whether the 
advanced features are worth an increased investment of time.  Yet, these are also the 
expectations the NLS faced when attempting to interest people in its disruptive practices.  
As Engelbart said in several documents written over the course of the NLS project, 
the co-evolution of people and tools is not an immediate process, but one that takes years. 
This approach can lead to a difficult rhetorical position—without evidence that the 
structuring convention actually benefitted readers or writers in significant ways, and ample 
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evidence that many found it restrictive, ARC found it difficult to argue that years should be 
spent learning to incorporate the convention into habitual writing work.  Any innovation 
that introduces discontinuous working practices can face this problem.  Designers can 
rarely accumulate enough evidence of benefits without a user base willing to take a chance 
on learning a new system that may or may not afford the kinds of activities they hope. 
Besides new artifacts and software, even writing pedagogies face these kinds of obstacles 
regarding evidence, as illustrated in Cooper and Holzman’s (1983) critique of Flower and 
Hayes’ (1981) cognitive process theory.  
Cooper and Holzman argue against the talk-aloud protocol as a method of obtaining 
direct data about cognitive processes at work during activity, saying that the protocols 
reproduced by Flower and Hayes seemed remarkably “focused,” never mentioning things 
other than the writing task.  They ask: “were the transcriptions of the protocols edited? Do 
protocols ‘capture a detailed record,’ or invent one, one as literary in its own way as those 
of Woolf and other writers?” (p. 290).  Turning to Engelbart’s depiction of his writing 
process using the NLS, it seems that his “protocol” of the six hours he spent writing with 
the NLS may have been completely invented—a depiction of the possibilities afforded by 
the NLS meant to entice or at least interest readers.  Of course, an invented story of writing 
with the NLS is not worthless or unbelievable as long as readers find supporting evidence 
that leads them to believe their experiences could be similar to that depicted in the report. 
However, accumulating such evidence presents a daunting challenge.  Cooper and 
Holzman, questioning the equivalency of contrived writing situations and real writing 
activity, ask: “How are we to investigate cognitive processes in general, or the writing 
